• Energy Research
• AU close

In a September 2010 media release the Prime Minister of Australia presented the terms of reference for the newly established Multi-Party Climate Change Committee. Although the Committee is charged with considering climate change mitigation measures in general, specifically the Committee must consider an appropriate mechanism for the establishment of a carbon price. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the mechanisms to be considered by the Climate Change Committee, including the use of emissions trading and carbon levies in other jurisdictions. This article argues that for any effective investigation of a carbon price for Australia to occur, a thorough knowledge of other jurisdictions’ methods for carbon pricing is essential.

The carbon tax in Australia, which is implemented from 1 July 2012, has become a controversial issue to the policy makers and people regarding its potential effects on the economy and society. Therefore, this paper analyses the various effects of the carbon tax with particular attention to Australian income distribution, employment and international competitiveness. The carbon tax will increase the inequality between the poor and the rich, as the poor will be adversely affected because of increased price of almost all essential items even in the presence of the government support program; regional disparity is also likely to increase. Employment will be reduced especially in coal, mining, steel, automotive and other manufacturing industries which will cause the shrinkage of GDP. The international competitiveness of Australian industries will also be reduced, as these industries will suffer because of higher production cost compared to foreign competitors. Some policy options such as reduction of goods and services tax (GST), a tax free allowance for essential use of energy, a lower carbon tax rate, border tax adjustments, permanent financial support to the poor may be considered to reduce the regressive effects.

The proposed carbon tax in Australia, which is scheduled to be implemented from 1 July 2012, has become a controversial issue to the policy makers and people regarding its potential effects on the economy and society. Therefore, this paper analyses the various effects of the carbon tax with particular attention on Australian income distribution, employment and international competitiveness. The carbon tax will increase the inequality between the poor and the rich, as the poor will be adversely affected because of increased price of almost all essential items even in the presence of the government support program; regional disparity is also likely to increase. Employment will be reduced especially in coal, mining, steel, automotive and other manufacturing industries which will cause the shrinkage of GDP. The international competitiveness of Australian industries will also be reduced, as these industries will suffer because of higher production cost compared to foreign competitors. Some policy options such as reduction of VAT, a tax free allowance for essential use of energy, a lower carbon tax rate, border tax adjustments, permanent financial support to the poor may be considered to reduce the regressive effects.

A rule for setting a tax on carbon emissions to limit their atmospheric stock to a predetermined level is developed for a world inhabited by uncoordinated, myopic, expected utility maximizing agents. In all locations, the mean of the marginal product of the carbon emitting input diminishes and the variance increases as climate deteriorates. The rule is illustrated for a world divided into poor countries and rich countries. The poor countries’ costs of non-compliance with the tax, in terms of per capita utility loss from diminished reputation, are negligible. The rich countries' costs of non-compliance and, consequently, inclination to pay the globally set tax can be substantial but not identical. The number of complying rich countries decreases with the tax level, but at a rate that is moderated by the range of the rich countries’ loss of per capita utility from abstinence.

As the world largest carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter, China is under pressure to develop policies to mitigate carbon emissions, with market-based approaches under consideration. Emissions trading is theoretically the most efficient approach but some countries are starting with carbon/energy taxes. This research examines these two options through literature and practice in order to evaluate which might be most suitable for China and then to estimate the major economic impacts of the selected option. The thesis first looks at the limited cases of emissions trading, with a particular focus, using official reports and data and interviews, on the example of SO2 control in Taiyuan city. It is found that the Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program does not seem to be functioning anything like the ideal emissions trading model and cannot be judged as a successful scheme in terms of emissions reductions, cost savings, innovation and investment in clean energy, and investment leakage. When combined with concerns about the limited development of truly free markets and the weak law basis in China, it is concluded that emissions trading may not be the best policy option at this stage and that a carbon tax might be the most practical interim measure. Next, the impacts of a carbon tax are considered through a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for China. The simulation results show that overall the introduction of a carbon tax will have a negative impact on the economy, but this negative impact is relatively gentle if considered against the emissions reductions. After a carbon tax is imposed, carbon intensive sectors will suffer most seriously and there will be a shift away from high-carbon factors toward low-carbon or non-carbon factors. Moreover, the adverse effects of the tax on economy could be relieved to some extent by subsidizing households, through transfers of the tax revenue. From the experience of Australia, China could also use carbon tax as a transitional policy and then move to carbon emissions trading system ...

This thesis is a study of whether the Australian Clean Energy Package complies with the rules of the World Trade Organization. It examines the legal framework for the Australian carbon pricing mechanism and related arrangements, using World Trade Organization law as the framework for analysis. In doing so, this thesis deconstructs the Clean Energy Package by considering the legal properties of eligible emissions units, the assistance measures introduced by the Package and the liabilities created by the carbon pricing mechanism.

While one sounds bad (the World Trade Organisation has rules that restrict tariffs) the other sounds understandable — if the European Union is imposing a carbon tax on its own products as Australia once did, surely it is reasonable to impose it on products from overseas.

The [Mineral Resources Rent Tax](http://theconversation.edu.au/pages/mining-tax) passed through the House of Representatives a few days ago, but not without negotiations with the Greens and independent MPs. Perhaps the most significant outcome of negotiations was the announcement of an [Independent Expert Scientific Committee](http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/new-focus-scientific-evidence-build-confidence-coal-seam-gas-and-coal-mining) to advise state and federal governments about the impacts of large coal and coal seam gas (CSG) projects. The decision is a very welcome one. Until now, government approvals for CSG projects have been granted on the basis of environmental impact statements (EISs) generated by proponents of the development they are assessing. As a result, and given the large tax revenues forthcoming from the projects, such assessments are hardly likely to have been free of bias. The problem of bias in the assessment and approvals process is inherent in all resource developments, not just coal seam gas (CSG) and large coal projects. While there will now be greater scrutiny of new projects, the horse has bolted in Queensland, where four large projects — to mine gas in the hinterland and ship liquified natural gas (LNG) [out of Gladstone](http://theconversation.edu.au/what-is-gladstones-lng-development-really-doing-to-the-environment-3885) — have already received state and commonwealth approvals. With these Queensland CSG projects already going ahead, more accurate assessment of their greenhouse gas emissions by the Australian and state governments is a high priority. The environmental impacts of our big mining and gas projects go to the very core of national and international efforts to tackle climate change.

© 2022 Catherine Alexander ; While climate change poses a major threat to humanity, policymakers have struggled to enact policy responses capable of addressing it. Some policy instruments have been implemented only to be repealed, creating a ‘durability challenge’ for governments seeking to address climate change. In light of this challenge, this thesis asks: which government strategies are most likely to embed new climate policies so that they can persist long enough to produce the desired effects? Policy durability has received less scholarly attention than policy enactment. Some scholars emphasise the strategic management of stakeholders and interest groups to promote durability (Patashnik 2008), while alternative explanations highlight the importance of securing broad public acceptance for the reform, including by persuasive communication from political leaders. There is not yet enough empirical research to provide clear answers. Accordingly, this thesis presents a comparative study of two carbon pricing reforms, one of which was successful (the policy proved durable), and the other not (the policy was not durable); this approach approximates J. S. Mill’s Most Similar Systems Design. The durable case is the carbon tax implemented in British Columbia (BC), Canada, in 2008, which remains in place, while the non-durable case is Australia’s Carbon Pricing Mechanism, sometimes called ‘the carbon tax’, implemented in 2012 and repealed two years later. The cases are compared to analyse the government strategies that promote policy durability, with BC’s successful trajectory throwing the problems in the Australian case into relief. This study finds that the strategic management of interest groups is not enough to secure policy durability, nor is sophisticated policy design a sufficient condition, particularly if the policymakers stumble on the politics. Instead, the thesis finds that policymakers should focus, above all, on securing broad public acceptance of the reform. These findings challenge the assumption that ...