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Greta Thunberg has called on politicians to “listen to the science” and take climate change seriously. But climate communication strategies can be more effective when “listening to the science” is complemented with “listening to society”.

Renewed COVID-19 outbreaks and uneven vaccination progress are prolonging the fight against the disease in developing Asia. This is contributing to a divergence in growth paths in the region that is partly being determined by the progress on tackling COVID-19. Asian Development Outlook 2021 Update raises regional growth forecasts for East Asia and Central Asia, and revises them down for South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. The main risks to the region’s economic prospects still center on the pandemic, particularly the emergence of new variants, lagging vaccine rollouts, and waning vaccine effectiveness. As economies recover from the pandemic, the threats of climate change will take center stage again. Sustainable food production and agricultural systems that are resilient to climate change will be crucial for developing Asia. To transform agriculture in the region, its economies must tackle challenges from changing consumer demand, changing demographics, and a changing and more fragile environment.

This publication is an initiative of the Government of Papua New Guinea that provides step-by-step guidance on how to rehabilitate mangroves. It aims to help address the impacts of climate change, particularly the coastal flooding prevalent in Papua New Guinea. It is a resource for the planting of mangroves for diverse purposes, including carbon absorption, nature conservation, support for fisheries, and ecotourism.

Taking Control of Oil provides a comprehensive assessment of recent global oil price trends, the exposure of PDMCs to oil price increases and its implications for social and economic development in the region. It also offers a number of policy options for managing risks associated with heavy dependence on oil imports and proposes a path for diversifying the energy mix in PDMCs.

While the COVID-19 pandemic appeared to temper concerns about climate change in 2020, the issue has risen to prominence again in 2021. The majority of Australians (60%) say ‘global warming is a serious and pressing problem…we should begin taking steps now, even if this involves significant costs’. This represents a reversal of the dip in 2020 during the early days of the pandemic, but remains eight points below the high watermark of concern in 2006. A third of Australians (30%) say the problem of global warming should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost. Only 9% of Australians — one of the lowest results of the past decade — say that until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs. As in recent years, there is a significant gap between younger and older Australians’ concerns about global warming. Despite a slight narrowing between the generations, the margin is still noteworthy, with three-quarters (76%) of Australians aged 18–29 saying global warming is a serious and pressing problem, compared with 50% of those over 60. Concern about global warming appears to be narrowing slightly between the urban and rural populations, with just a 7-point gap between the 63% of Australians living in cities saying that global warming is a serious and pressing problem, and the 56% of the regional and remote population.

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement enables countries to utilize market and nonmarket approaches to achieve their nationally determined contributions. Yet, international negotiations on Article 6 are complex and ongoing. The Parties of the Paris Agreement have made progress on many issues, but contentious matters on political and technical aspects remain unresolved. This publication presents the latest developments in negotiations, discusses the key outcomes, and highlights the remaining unresolved issues leading up to the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties in Glasgow.

This report explores the role of Myanmar’s state and region governments in the development of the country’s energy sector, and how they can increase their agency in shaping their own and the nation’s energy future. It is a companion to the Asia Foundation’s October 2018 report, State and Region Governments in Myanmar, which examines the structure and execution of subnational governance and articulates needed reforms. Like that earlier effort, this report incorporates the views of state and region governments themselves on the challenges and opportunities presented by Myanmar’s evolving energy sector. Myanmar’s Union government has been gradually devolving legal and administrative powers to the states and regions since 2011, but these new powers often exist in an uncertain and untested relationship to the traditional powers and prerogatives of the central government. In the energy sector, the states and regions clearly have room to be more assertive in the areas of policy and planning; public consultation and permitting; management of the local (11 kV) electrical grid; off-grid energy, especially renewable energy mini-grids; and the promotion of private investment. This report describes how state and region governments are discharging their energy-sector responsibilities, and the extent to which existing policies and guidelines empower state/region officials to act to meet regional energy needs.

Thus, this study will map out the current situation of DES in selected ASEAN Member States, and discuss the opportunities for DES in the ASEAN region to support and foster the convergence of the ASEAN Economic Community and sustainable economic growth by providing affordable, reliable, and better energy sources with less GHG emissions.

The main purpose of the paper is to design an approach which will indicate how information available from current practices in investment planning in the power sector can be exploited to conduct rigorous cost-benefit analysis. The contribution of the paper lies in extending the analysis to the third module where net benefit maximization occurs at a given level and structure of tariffs. It provides the interface between least-cost and cost-benefit analysis in the power sector by using information contained in the least-cost investment plan to identify and quantify benefits. By itself, least-cost analysis says nothing about the economic merits of an investment program or project since even a least-cost program may have costs that exceed its benefits. Whenever possible, it is necessary to consider whether benefits are adequate. Hence, least-cost analysis is a necessary but not sufficient condition for maximization of net benefits. Both least-cost and cost- benefit analysis are required together to ensure maximization of net benefits. By highlighting the issues involved in making the transition from least-cost to cost benefit analysis in power sector investment planning, Che paper provides a feasible and more rigorous approach Co economic analysis of investment in power system. It addresses the problem of the comparison of costs and benefits in the power sector to determine the volume of investment to the power sector and its allocation within its major components.

The tax incentives designed to stimulate firm investment may have a large impact on labour market outcomes. Using a comprehensive data set containing more than 1 million Chinese manufacturing firms during the period 2000–2013 with a difference-in-difference approach, we examine the impact of the value-added tax reform in 2004–2008 on the firm-level labour market outcomes. We find that firms in eligible industries and regions (treated firms) enjoying lower costs of purchasing fixed assets under the reform tended to increase capital investment and reduce employment relative to firms that did not have tax incentives (the control firms). Compared with the control firms, the treated firms became more capital intensive and had an increase in average wage but a decline in labour income share. We also provide evidence that the substitutions of labour input by capital input is associated with increases in firm productivity and the share of skilled workers, but not imported capital goods.