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Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement stand as milestone diplomatic achievements. However, immense discrepancies between political commitments and governmental action remain. Combined national climate commitments fall far short of the Paris Agreement's 1.5/2°C targets. Similar political ambition gaps persist across various areas of sustainable development. Many therefore argue that actions by nonstate actors, such as businesses and investors, cities and regions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are crucial. These voices have resonated across the United Nations (UN) system, leading to growing recognition, promotion, and mobilization of such actions in ever greater numbers. This article investigates optimistic arguments about nonstate engagement, namely: (a) “the more the better”; (b) “everybody wins”; (c) “everyone does their part”; and (d) “more brings more.” However, these optimistic arguments may not be matched in practice due to governance risks. The current emphasis on quantifiable impacts may lead to the under‐appreciation of variegated social, economic, and environmental impacts. Claims that everybody stands to benefit may easily be contradicted by outcomes that are not in line with priorities and needs in developing countries. Despite the seeming depoliticization of the role of nonstate actors in implementation, actions may still lead to politically contentious outcomes. Finally, nonstate climate and sustainability actions may not be self‐reinforcing but may heavily depend on supporting mechanisms. The article concludes with governance risk‐reduction strategies that can be combined to maximize nonstate potential in sustainable and climate‐resilient transformations.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement stand as milestone diplomatic achievements. However, immense discrepancies between political commitments and governmental action remain. Combined national climate commitments fall far short of the Paris Agreement's 1.5/2°C targets. Similar political ambition gaps persist across various areas of sustainable development. Many therefore argue that actions by nonstate actors, such as businesses and investors, cities and regions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are crucial. These voices have resonated across the United Nations (UN) system, leading to growing recognition, promotion, and mobilization of such actions in ever greater numbers. This article investigates optimistic arguments about nonstate engagement, namely: (a) “the more the better”; (b) “everybody wins”; (c) “everyone does their part”; and (d) “more brings more.” However, these optimistic arguments may not be matched in practice due to governance risks. The current emphasis on quantifiable impacts may lead to the under‐appreciation of variegated social, economic, and environmental impacts. Claims that everybody stands to benefit may easily be contradicted by outcomes that are not in line with priorities and needs in developing countries. Despite the seeming depoliticization of the role of nonstate actors in implementation, actions may still lead to politically contentious outcomes. Finally, nonstate climate and sustainability actions may not be self‐reinforcing but may heavily depend on supporting mechanisms. The article concludes with governance risk‐reduction strategies that can be combined to maximize nonstate potential in sustainable and climate‐resilient transformations.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Abstract The implementation of climate policies in the US and EU in light of uncertainties about future international climate policy has shifted attention to two interrelated concerns, namely competitiveness and carbon leakage. Although various policy measures are available to address these concerns, there has been much discussion about one such measure in particular: the use of offsetting measures at the border. This article compares policy discussions in the US and the EU on how to address competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns, with a focus on the role of import-related border adjustment measures. It analyses the kinds of measures that so far have been put forward with a view to addressing competitiveness and carbon leakage; compares the approaches to the problems in the US and the EU; and provides a preliminary discussion of international cooperation on border adjustment measures. It concludes that two kinds of cooperation are needed between the EU and the US – not only cooperation through formal international negotiations, but also cooperation through international learning processes, in which the EU and the US learn from each other about design and implementation issues as they develop their respective cap-and-trade systems.

Abstract The implementation of climate policies in the US and EU in light of uncertainties about future international climate policy has shifted attention to two interrelated concerns, namely competitiveness and carbon leakage. Although various policy measures are available to address these concerns, there has been much discussion about one such measure in particular: the use of offsetting measures at the border. This article compares policy discussions in the US and the EU on how to address competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns, with a focus on the role of import-related border adjustment measures. It analyses the kinds of measures that so far have been put forward with a view to addressing competitiveness and carbon leakage; compares the approaches to the problems in the US and the EU; and provides a preliminary discussion of international cooperation on border adjustment measures. It concludes that two kinds of cooperation are needed between the EU and the US – not only cooperation through formal international negotiations, but also cooperation through international learning processes, in which the EU and the US learn from each other about design and implementation issues as they develop their respective cap-and-trade systems.

This chapter maps and assesses the global climate change institutions and policies that relate to energy. First, we introduce the links between climate change governance and energy and discuss some current trends in energy use and their implications for climate change policy. Subsequently, we introduce the global climate governance architecture, including international and transnational arenas and institutions before we analyze each setting in more detail. The next section discusses the energy-related interlinkages between climate change and other issue areas, while the final section suggests options for managing interlinkages and provides an outlook on future research challenges.

This chapter maps and assesses the global climate change institutions and policies that relate to energy. First, we introduce the links between climate change governance and energy and discuss some current trends in energy use and their implications for climate change policy. Subsequently, we introduce the global climate governance architecture, including international and transnational arenas and institutions before we analyze each setting in more detail. The next section discusses the energy-related interlinkages between climate change and other issue areas, while the final section suggests options for managing interlinkages and provides an outlook on future research challenges.

The debate about post-2012 global climate governance has been framed largely by proponents and opponents of the policymaking process established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In light of the proliferation of institutions governing some aspects of climate change, analysts have asked whether a centralized or a polycentric climate governance architecture will be more effective, efficient, equitable, or viable. While these are valid questions, they obscure the fact that global climate governance is already polycentric, or rather: fragmented. This paper argues that the more pertinent questions are how to sensibly link the different elements of global climate governance, and what the role of the UNFCCC could be in this regard. We examine these two questions for three aspects of global climate governance: international climate technology initiatives; emerging emissions trading systems; and unilateral trade measures. The paper shows that there are strong arguments for coordination in all of these cases, and illustrates the possible role of the UNFCCC. It concludes, however, that possibilities for coordination will eventually be limited by underlying tensions that will plague any future climate governance architecture.