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Abstract China's industrial transformation of the past thirty years, when its GDP has been increasing by an average of 10% per year, has been underpinned by an energy industrial revolution. Electrical energy is the driver of this transformation, with China utilizing latecomer advantages in building an electrical energy generation machine of prodigious size. In terms of electrical energy generated, China's system has expanded twelve-fold in 30 years, from 280 TWh in 1980 to over 3500 TWh in 2010. In this paper we describe the principal features of this remarkable transformation, examining the official projections to 2020, the semi-official projections to 2050, and offering our own projections based on observed logistic industrial dynamics for the uptake of renewable energies as well as the continuing role to be played by fossil fuels, particularly coal. We emphasize the role to be played by China's construction of a ‘strong and smart’ electric power grid, as envisaged in the 12th Five Year Plan released in March 2011, and the complementary proposals to build a national high speed rail system. We see China as on track to phase out fossil fuels altogether in its power production system by the end of the century. We develop an argument as to why it might be expected that fossil fuel utilization will decline while renewable energy utilization might increase in China, constituting a genuine energy industrial revolution.

Abstract China's industrial transformation of the past thirty years, when its GDP has been increasing by an average of 10% per year, has been underpinned by an energy industrial revolution. Electrical energy is the driver of this transformation, with China utilizing latecomer advantages in building an electrical energy generation machine of prodigious size. In terms of electrical energy generated, China's system has expanded twelve-fold in 30 years, from 280 TWh in 1980 to over 3500 TWh in 2010. In this paper we describe the principal features of this remarkable transformation, examining the official projections to 2020, the semi-official projections to 2050, and offering our own projections based on observed logistic industrial dynamics for the uptake of renewable energies as well as the continuing role to be played by fossil fuels, particularly coal. We emphasize the role to be played by China's construction of a ‘strong and smart’ electric power grid, as envisaged in the 12th Five Year Plan released in March 2011, and the complementary proposals to build a national high speed rail system. We see China as on track to phase out fossil fuels altogether in its power production system by the end of the century. We develop an argument as to why it might be expected that fossil fuel utilization will decline while renewable energy utilization might increase in China, constituting a genuine energy industrial revolution.

The shift to renewable energy options and low-carbon technologies, in response to the concerns over energy security and climate change, is proceeding more slowly than many would like. The usual argument against rapid deployment of new technologies is the costs imposed on the economy, commonly interpreted in terms of upfront costs to be borne or involving large cash transfers to fund, for example, efforts to preserve rainforests. In this contribution I argue that such a perspective provides a continuing barrier to taking effective action, whereas a perspective based on creation and use of carbon credits provides a means of avoiding the shock of abrupt industrial change. Carbon credits granted for bona fide carbon load reductions could be created through private initiative, for example by merchant banks, to constitute a market that will complement regulatory-based initiatives such as national emissions trading systems. This is not a novel idea; indeed it is the way that capitalism has funded every major change, including the Industrial Revolution, through the creation of credit. The emergence of a global carbon credit economy is likely to precede a global regulatory system governing climate change and will doubtless help to stimulate the emergence of such a global system.

The shift to renewable energy options and low-carbon technologies, in response to the concerns over energy security and climate change, is proceeding more slowly than many would like. The usual argument against rapid deployment of new technologies is the costs imposed on the economy, commonly interpreted in terms of upfront costs to be borne or involving large cash transfers to fund, for example, efforts to preserve rainforests. In this contribution I argue that such a perspective provides a continuing barrier to taking effective action, whereas a perspective based on creation and use of carbon credits provides a means of avoiding the shock of abrupt industrial change. Carbon credits granted for bona fide carbon load reductions could be created through private initiative, for example by merchant banks, to constitute a market that will complement regulatory-based initiatives such as national emissions trading systems. This is not a novel idea; indeed it is the way that capitalism has funded every major change, including the Industrial Revolution, through the creation of credit. The emergence of a global carbon credit economy is likely to precede a global regulatory system governing climate change and will doubtless help to stimulate the emergence of such a global system.

La inyección de carbón vegetal por toberas en Altos Hornos, aqui denominada Bio-PCI, se presenta como una forma atractiva y realista de reducir significativamente las emisiones de CO2 generadas durante la producción de arrabio. En esta contribución se presenta un resumen de los fundamentos tecnológicos, los beneficios y las limitaciones de la incorporación de la tecnología del Bio-PCI. Adicionalmente se exponen los retos económicos que enfrentan los combustibles renovables a los fósiles, con especial interés en los principales costos de producción del carbón vegetal. En este sentido se plantea una pregunta estratégica: ¿puede la biomasa residual impulsar el desarrollo de la Bio-PCI?. Nuestro análisis conlleva a concluir que la utilización de biomasa residual (residuos forestales y agrícolas) puede reducir sensiblemente el costo del carbón vegetal entre 120-180 USD/t en comparación con biomasa primaria, incrementando su competitividad frente al carbón mineral.

La inyección de carbón vegetal por toberas en Altos Hornos, aqui denominada Bio-PCI, se presenta como una forma atractiva y realista de reducir significativamente las emisiones de CO2 generadas durante la producción de arrabio. En esta contribución se presenta un resumen de los fundamentos tecnológicos, los beneficios y las limitaciones de la incorporación de la tecnología del Bio-PCI. Adicionalmente se exponen los retos económicos que enfrentan los combustibles renovables a los fósiles, con especial interés en los principales costos de producción del carbón vegetal. En este sentido se plantea una pregunta estratégica: ¿puede la biomasa residual impulsar el desarrollo de la Bio-PCI?. Nuestro análisis conlleva a concluir que la utilización de biomasa residual (residuos forestales y agrícolas) puede reducir sensiblemente el costo del carbón vegetal entre 120-180 USD/t en comparación con biomasa primaria, incrementando su competitividad frente al carbón mineral.

Abstract Capitalism is arguably the most amazing cultural and economic product of humankind. It nurtured political liberty in Europe; it ushered in the industrial revolution in Britain and then around the world; it raised incomes everywhere; and it cleared away centuries of obscurantism and superstition. But it also brought into being a ‘spirit of capitalism’ that is individualist, expansive, acquisitive, ruthlessly rational and insatiable. This spirit has been responsible for commodifying relations and turning the natural world into a ‘resource base’ on the one hand, and a sink for wastes at the other. The industrial scale of this objectification and destruction of the natural setting has proceeded to the point where it is global, and now threatens our industrial civilization with collapse. My purpose in this paper is to sketch an account of how industrial capitalism might be ‘naturalized’, so that it continues to grow and deliver improvements in the quality of life without destroying humankind's resource base, and the biosphere as well. My focus is on rules and institutions rather than policies or prescriptions. My argument is that a green economy is already growing within the old, fossil-fuel economy, and that through competitive dynamics it will dominate by mid-century – unless blocked politically by vested interests.

Abstract Capitalism is arguably the most amazing cultural and economic product of humankind. It nurtured political liberty in Europe; it ushered in the industrial revolution in Britain and then around the world; it raised incomes everywhere; and it cleared away centuries of obscurantism and superstition. But it also brought into being a ‘spirit of capitalism’ that is individualist, expansive, acquisitive, ruthlessly rational and insatiable. This spirit has been responsible for commodifying relations and turning the natural world into a ‘resource base’ on the one hand, and a sink for wastes at the other. The industrial scale of this objectification and destruction of the natural setting has proceeded to the point where it is global, and now threatens our industrial civilization with collapse. My purpose in this paper is to sketch an account of how industrial capitalism might be ‘naturalized’, so that it continues to grow and deliver improvements in the quality of life without destroying humankind's resource base, and the biosphere as well. My focus is on rules and institutions rather than policies or prescriptions. My argument is that a green economy is already growing within the old, fossil-fuel economy, and that through competitive dynamics it will dominate by mid-century – unless blocked politically by vested interests.

Abstract While uptake of renewable energies as a solution to climate change is widely discussed, the issue of public vs. private financing is not yet adequately explored. The debates over the Kyoto Protocol and its successor, culminating in the COP15 Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, maintained a strong preference for public over private financing. Yet it is also clear to most observers that the energy revolution will never happen without the involvement of private finance to drive private investment. In this Viewpoint, we discuss the ways in which private financing could be mobilized to drive the energy industrial revolution that is needed if climate change mitigation is to succeed.