• Energy Research

The target of zero emissions sets a new standard for industry and industrial policy. Industrial policy in the twenty-first century must aim to achieve zero emissions in the energy and emissions int...

The global objective to limit human-induced warming to 2°C requires that global emissions are reduced by 50% by 2050. However, industrialized countries need to do much more. The principle of burden...

If we are to limit global warming to 2 °C, all sectors in all countries must reduce their emissions of GHGs to zero not later than 2060–2080. Zero-emission options have been less explored and are less developed in the energy-intensive basic materials industries than in other sectors. Current climate policies have not yet motivated major efforts to decarbonize this sector, and it has been largely protected from climate policy due to the perceived risks of carbon leakage and a focus on short-term reduction targets to 2020. We argue that the future global climate policy regime must develop along three interlinked and strategic lines to facilitate a deep decarbonization of energy-intensive industries. First, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility must be reinterpreted to allow for a dialogue on fairness and the right to development in relation to industry. Second, a greater focus on the development, deployment and transfer of technology in this sector is called for. Third, the potential con...

Meeting the goals set out in the Paris Agreement will require rapid and deep reductions of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) across all sectors of the global economy. Like all major societal transformations, this climate transition will impact both social and technical aspects of society and, depending on how it evolves, will reallocate social and economic benefits and costs differently. Recognising the importance of decarbonising key industry sectors with large GHG emissions and an significant impact on society, this study explores the opportunities and tensions involved in a transition of the petrochemical industry. We do so by analysing how access to natural resources, the petrochemical industry's role in the economy and the socio-political landscape in key petrochemical producing countries impacts prerequisites for change. The assessment shows that devising adequate policy responses, building legitimacy for change and potentially building bottom-up pressure for a timely climate transition are likely to look very different in the 10 countries with the greatest active petrochemical capacity in the world: China, the United States, India, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Russia, Iran, Germany and Taiwan. The indicators used to explore the prerequisites for change all point to areas where actions and policies must advance for a transition to be realised. This includes efforts to cap fossil feedstock supply and production capacity, efforts to limit and ultimately reduce demand for plastics and fertilisers, and measures to formulate transition strategies and policies that capture and provide agency for communities and groups that are currently on the receiving end of negative health and environmental impacts from the petrochemical industry and that will also, in many cases, be most closely affected by a transition.

The energy intensive industry, producing basic materials, is responsible for 25 to 30% of today's global greenhouse gas emissions. The future supply of GHG neutral basic materials (e.g. steel, cement, aluminium, plastics, etc.) is a necessity for building a sustainable modern society. Deep decarbonisation of the energy intensive industries is technically possible but will require a major systemic shift in production processes and energy carriers used, which will require large public support in the form of subsidies and high carbon prices. A key barrier for implementing ambitious climate policies targeting energy intensive industries is the inherent conflict between the global nature of energy intensive industries and the existing climate policy framework that is based on nation states taking action according to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. This approach could lead to carbon leakage and the introduction of carbon trade measures has been the default proposition from academics to ameliorate these concerns. However, another way is to define the task of decarbonizing EIIs as a global task and not as a purely national matter and to cooperate internationally. In this paper we analyse what it takes to decarbonize energy intensive industry and what implications this transition can have for trade. From here we explore the opportunities for enhanced cooperation for deep decarbonisation for EIIs within the Paris Agreement. We argue for international cooperation by establishing a green materials club that would focus on long-term technology development. This could be a viable way to ease the current shortterm conflicts and mitigate the need for carbon tariffs. However, a green materials club should still be a part of a wider discussion around what is considered fair trade practices under the climate convention and how this relates to national interest and industrial policy for the decarbonisation of basic materials production. (Less)

Abstract This study considers the technical potential concerning the energy efficiency attainable for vehicles with alternative powertrains within 10–20 years. The potential for electric vehicles (BEVs), hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) and fuel-cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) is assessed and compared with the potential improvement in conventional vehicles with internal combustion engines (ICEVs). Primary energy efficiency is the measure used in this study for comparison. The calculations of primary energy efficiency are based on three different resources: fossil fuels, biomass, and primary electricity from wind, solar or hydropower. This study shows that there is potential for doubling the primary energy efficiency using alternative powertrains in vehicles such as BEVs, HEVs and FCEVs, compared with existing ICEVs. All vehicles with an alternative powertrain have a higher potential for primary energy efficiency than vehicles with an improved conventional powertrain. No “winner” amongst the alternative powertrains could be identified from a primary energy efficiency point of view.