• Energy Research

AbstractAs losses from extreme weather events grow, many governments are looking to privatize the financing and incentivization of climate adaptation through insurance markets. In a pure market approach to insurance for extreme weather events, individuals become responsible for ensuring they are adequately covered for risks to their own properties, and governments no longer contribute funds to post‐disaster recovery. Theoretically, insurance premiums signal the level of risk faced by each household, and incentivize homeowners to invest in adaptive action, such as retrofitting, or drainage work, to reduce premiums. Where risk is considered too high by insurance markets, housing is devalued, in theory leading to retreat from risky areas. In this review article, we evaluate the suitability of private insurance as a mechanism for climate adaptation at a household and community level. We find a mismatch between social understandings of responsibility for climate risks, and the technocratic, market‐based home insurance products offered by private insurance markets. We suggest that by constructing increasingly individualized, technical, and calculative evaluations of risk, market‐based models of insurance for extreme weather events erode the solidaristic and collective discourses and practices that support adaptive behavior.This article is categorized under: Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change > Institutions for Adaptation

AbstractClimate change is a partisan issue, with increasingly politically polarised responses, particularly in Anglophone countries. While politics clearly have a role in determining attitudes to climate science and policy, understanding the human values that underlie attitudes offers advantages over a focus on political differences. This study examines public concern about climate change in Hobart, the state capital of Tasmania, Australia. Hobart is a microcosm of polarisation about environmental issues due to its long history of conflict over natural resource use. Using a survey of 522 citizens of Hobart, the research examines the values underlying concern and unconcern about climate change. Applying an innovative analysis of human values to this area of research, I have found that, in the Tasmanian context, the unconcerned may be categorised into two groups with opposing values: people who prioritise national security, social order, and tradition; and people who value freedom of choice and the ability to make their own decisions. High levels of climate change concern are associated strongly with care for nature, suggesting that climate change is seen primarily as a threat to the environment, rather than to humanity. In this article, I argue that understanding the values underlying divergent interpretations of the threat of climate change is essential to resolving deadlock in political discourse. The work draws lessons for re‐engaging the unconcerned in inclusive conversations about climate change through narratives addressing a broader range of values.

Abstract Science is integral to society because it can inform individual, government, corporate, and civil society decision-making on issues such as public health, new technologies or climate change. Yet, public distrust and populist sentiment challenge the relationship between science and society. To help researchers analyse the science-society nexus across different geographical and cultural contexts, we undertook a cross-sectional population survey resulting in a dataset of 71,922 participants in 68 countries. The data were collected between November 2022 and August 2023 as part of the global Many Labs study “Trust in Science and Science-Related Populism” (TISP). The questionnaire contained comprehensive measures for individuals’ trust in scientists, science-related populist attitudes, perceptions of the role of science in society, science media use and communication behaviour, attitudes to climate change and support for environmental policies, personality traits, political and religious views and demographic characteristics. Here, we describe the dataset, survey materials and psychometric properties of key variables. We encourage researchers to use this unique dataset for global comparative analyses on public perceptions of science and its role in society and policy-making.

Home insurance for extreme weather events is a significant security mechanism not only for individual households but for global finance. As extreme weather events become more frequent and intense, home insurance has been identified by governments as a critical tool for climate adaptation and disaster resilience. However, the growing research literature on the interactions between household insurance and extreme climatic events has not previously been systematically reviewed. In this paper, we analyse 175 original peer-reviewed empirical research papers on this subject, published between 2009 and 2018. We identify areas of research focus, themes, spatial and temporal patterns, and knowledge gaps, and examine policy implications of these findings. We find that an overall focus on flood insurance leaves unanswered questions about the different insurantial challenges posed by storms and wildfire. We suggest existing technocratic and calculative insurance narratives obscure the political and moral assumptions embedded within them, and that these assumptions warrant further investigation in the context of socially legitimate insurance against the impact of extreme weather events.

Polarization in environmental conflicts obstructs decision making at all scales. The Australian state of Tasmania has a history of intense polarization around environmental issues. This article uses a social study of citizens of the capital, Hobart, and a case study of a recent attempt to disrupt polarization about forestry in Tasmania, to develop a novel conceptualization of ‘ruts’ in environmental conflicts. Ruts are formed when polarizing social constructs gain a momentum that perpetuates entrenched discourse coalitions and storylines into subsequent issues. This is evidenced in attitudinal survey results, and in interviews that show how storylines from the forestry debate frame people’s responses to climate change. The case study describes negotiations in the forestry conflict that had some success in disrupting these polarized discourses. After the long-term failure of the traditional authorities of government and science to resolve conflict over Tasmania’s forests, a sub-political process emerged to directly renegotiate a shared definition of risk. The study shows that new coalitions of players from outside traditional systems of authority have the potential to disrupt polarized discourses, through the creation of shared storylines. The challenge is to be prepared to acknowledge the legitimacy of divergent values, and to seek framings that sidestep, rather than confront strongly held conflicting values. Insights from this article are likely to be of value for other environmental conflicts, including climate change.

Extensive research into public attitudes about climate change commonly portrays those who do not express concern about this issue as unwitting victims of their own or others’ biases. Characterised as apathy, ignorance, scepticism or denial, absence of concern about climate change has been presented as being rooted in an individual’s lack of considered engagement with scientific reasons for concern. This ‘concern deficit’ is framed as a problem to be addressed through policy, education and communication that seeks to maximise concern about climate change. In contrast, we conceptualise unconcern about climate change as an expression of focal life concerns that are incommensurable with dominant narratives of climate change. Originating in active cognitive, social and experiential processes, we regard unconcern about climate change as inseparable from the lived contexts in which it is expressed and irreducible to the attitudes or attributes of individuals. Using narrative analysis of repeat in-depth interviews with Australians who express unconcern about climate change, we find that this unconcern has multiple sources, takes diverse forms and is entangled in epistemological and normative engagements with other issues. It is constituted through social relationships, discursive processes, moral values and embodied experiences that are overlooked in much existing research. We argue that respectful attention to the experiential conditions in which concern about climate change is resisted can enable constructive re-negotiation of narratives of climate change. Such agonistic processes could lead to more reflexive, pluralist and dialogical forms of discourse that better articulate climate science and policy with a wider diversity of lived concerns.