• Energy Research

Although the innovation effects of carbon trading mechanism (CTM) have attracted considerable concern, there is still a lack of empirical research on how the CTM promotes the efficiency of green innovation in China. Therefore, this paper purposes to investigate how CTM affects the efficiency of green innovation and revels its potential paths, including industrial structure, energy structure, technological innovation, human capital, and foreign direct investment (FDI), based on panel data of 30 provinces and cities in China spanning from 2008 to 2020. SBM-DEA model is employed to calculate the efficiency of green innovation in 30 provinces and cities. We then employ the synthetic control method (SCM) to investigate the influence of the CTM on the efficiency of green innovation, and the results show that the CTM can improve the efficiency of green innovation. By using the Hausman model, several conclusions are obtained. First, the CTM has a positive effect on improving the efficiency of green innovation. Second, from 2008 to 2020, the efficiency of green innovation in China is continuously improving, although it is still imbalanced across regions. Third, the CTM can influence the efficiency of green innovation by affecting the industrial structure, energy structure, human capital, and FDI.

Global climate change is closely related to conventional energy consumption. Taking the regulations for emissions into account, this article uses a game theory approach to identify industries depending on conventional energies to reduce emissions. This paper proposes to design a suitable supervisory system for emission regulation based on limited supervisor and asymmetric production efficiency. Two different supervision mechanism, random and selected supervisions, are employed. Some interesting conclusions are achieved. Firstly, the greater the level of competition, the smaller the number of firms with emission-reduction technology (ERT) are. Interestingly, the number of firms without ERT increases faster than does the number of firms with ERT. Secondly, under the asymmetric case, the threshold value for firms with low production costs that always employ emission-reduction technology is presented. Finally, this paper proves that firms with higher production costs have greater incentives to avoid emission restriction. Based on the above conclusions, the corresponding policy implications or regulation institutions to reduce climate changes are outlined. Random inspect is optimal if firms’ efficiency information, measured by production cost, is incomplete, while selected supervise is better if efficiency information is complete.

Due to the incentive policies of governments, renewable energy plays an increasingly important role in the global energy supply system. Among the subsidy schemes, the one-off subsidy is mainly applied in the projects with a long investment period where the time value of money cannot be ignored due to the long payback period. In this article, a microeconomic model of enterprises with a discount factor is established. The impact of the one-off subsidy by the government is discussed in different periods. The results show that only when the investment period is long enough, the government would give the enterprise one-off subsidy and the given subsidy is positively correlated with the investment period. Besides, the enterprise is more willing to invest in the project when getting close to the end of the investment period and the subsidy increases with the growth of capital-output elasticity. This article analyzes the optimal period of giving the one-off subsidy under the condition of different internal rates of return (IRRs). Based on the extended framework of subsidy analysis by game theory, it is found that if IRR of the enterprise is larger than that of the government, the subsidy is suggested to be given at the beginning of the project.

Emission restriction reduces total emission and protects environment. With game theory model, this paper investigates firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices by taking emission restriction into account. CSR means a firm care about consumer surplus and environment pollution result in greenhouse gas emission in this study. All the effects of CSR practices, emission restriction and their interactions on firms' strategies are captured under duopoly Cournot competition. Some interesting conclusions are achieved. Firstly, the firm subjects to emission restriction prices lower than its profit maximum (PM) rival. Secondly, if the CSR firm is subject to emission restriction, social concern has no effect on firms' prices, outputs, profits and social welfare. Thirdly, social welfare decreases with product substitutability. Interestingly, when the CSR firm's emission restriction is non-binding, both CSR firm's profits and social welfare has inverse U-shaped relationships with social concern. Finally, this paper finds that the optimal level of social concern under the status that CSR firm aims to achieve maximum profits is lower than that under the condition the CSR firms aim to obtain maximum social welfare. Keywords: Environmental responsibility, Social concern, Social welfare, Regulation, JEL classification: JEL, L1, L2, D4, M1, H2

Cooperative green innovation is an important tool to cope with global climate change and this article highlights cooperative green innovation with game theory. Some interesting conclusions are achieved. First, emission tax stimulates the innovation for all firms. Second, free-rider phenomena appear in cooperative green innovation. When the cooperative green innovation requires big investment, firms have intention to launch free-rider. Finally, the underinvestment of cooperative green innovation exists. This article suggests to regulate innovative investment and to subsidize to improve cooperative green innovation.

Marsh gas is an important type of renewable energies and plays important role to solve the energy issue in remote countryside. This article captures the development of marsh gas in Gongcheng County of China with game theory model. Firstly, the development history of marsh gas in Gongcheng County is introduced. Secondly, the economic effects of all subsidy strategy are discussed. Subsidy to family marsh gas popularizes the marsh gas. Thirdly, whether to subsidize firms depends on transportation costs. Therefore, for the disperse residents, subsidy to family marsh gas seems more rational than that to firms. For concentrated residents, the conclusions are contrary. Keywords: Subsidy, Energy, Bioenergy, Forest, Gongcheng, Countryside development

Innovation plays extremely important roles in the society, and underinvestment in innovation popularly exists. This article aims to capture innovative subsidy with game theory model. First, unilateral subsidy stimulates both innovation and outputs of subsidized firms, while it deters those of opponents. Second, under innovation subsidy, relationship between subsidized firm's innovation and product substitutability satisfies a U shape. For opponents, it is also a U‐shaped relationship. Third, under unilateral subsidy, subsidizing high‐efficiency firms yields more innovation than subsidizing low‐efficiency firms. Finally, bilateral subsidy stimulates more innovation than unilateral subsidy. This study supports theory to subsidize innovation efficiently.

Abstract The industrial sector is the key area for China to achieve the carbon peaking goals, as it accounts for more than 65% and 70% of the national total energy consumption and carbon emissions. However, the discussion on the time and route of carbon peak in China in the existing literature is still quite different. In this study, we establish three scenarios and comprehensively used Monte Carlo simulation and LSTM Neural Network model to predict the evolution trends of China's industrial carbon emissions during 2020–2030. Firstly, the decomposition results of the Generalized Divisia Index Method shows that fixed assets investment is the most important factor for promoting and carbon intensity of investment is the key for reducing carbon emissions. Then, basing on the Monte Carlo dynamic simulation, we could draw the three kinds of carbon emissions route that it will peak in 2031 in the Baseline scenario, in the Green Development scenario (environmental policy improvement) and Technological Breakthrough scenario (green technology progress) will peak in 2027 and 2025, and under the LSTM Neural Network model, peak time will occur in 2028. Comparing the results of above predictions, China's industrial carbon emissions could peak by 2030(in GD scenario, 2027; TB scenario, 2025). Finally, we discuss the path of China's industrial carbon emissions reduction and provide a reference for the rational formulation of low-carbon regulatory policies in the future and the realization of sustainable development.

Both carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems are widely applied to reduce emission. This article compares the clean innovation effects of carbon tax with cap-and-trade systems by a static optimal model. Firstly, both cap-and-trade system and carbon tax stimulates clean innovation and reduce emission. Secondly, cap-and-trade system is more efficient to reduce emission and to promote clean innovation than carbon tax. Finally, firms undertake a loss under carbon tax, while the effects of cap-and-trade system on firms' profits are uncertain, which depends on the carbon cap. In summary, this article supports cap-and-trade system to cope with global climate change, but the regulator should choose the suitable emission cap and carbon trading price to guarantee the efficiency of cap-and-trade system. So, different purposes match with different carbon emission tax policies.