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A real options model is developed to evaluate wind energy investments in a realistic and easily applicable way. Considering optimal investment timing and sizing (capacity choice), the model introduces a capacity constraint as part of the optimisation. Several correlated uncertainty factors are combined into a single stochastic process, which allows for analytical (closed-form) solutions. The approach is well suited for quantitative policy analysis, such as the comparison of different support schemes. A case study for offshore wind in the Baltic Sea quantifies differences in investment incentives under feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums and tradable green certificates. Investors can under certificate schemes require up to 3% higher profit margins than under tariffs due to higher variance in profits. Feed-in tariffs may lead to 15% smaller project sizes. This trade-off between faster deployment of smaller projects and slower deployment of larger projects is neglected using traditional net present value approaches. In the analysis of such trade-off, previous real options studies did not consider a capacity constraint, which is here shown to decrease the significance of the effect. The impact on investment incentives also depends on correlations between the underlying stochastic factors. The results may help investors to make informed investment decisions and policy makers to strategically design renewable support and develop tailor-made incentive schemes.

A real options model is developed to evaluate wind energy investments in a realistic and easily applicable way. Considering optimal investment timing and sizing (capacity choice), the model introduces a capacity constraint as part of the optimisation. Several correlated uncertainty factors are combined into a single stochastic process, which allows for analytical (closed-form) solutions. The approach is well suited for quantitative policy analysis, such as the comparison of different support schemes. A case study for offshore wind in the Baltic Sea quantifies differences in investment incentives under feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums and tradable green certificates. Investors can under certificate schemes require up to 3% higher profit margins than under tariffs due to higher variance in profits. Feed-in tariffs may lead to 15% smaller project sizes. This trade-off between faster deployment of smaller projects and slower deployment of larger projects is neglected using traditional net present value approaches. In the analysis of such trade-off, previous real options studies did not consider a capacity constraint, which is here shown to decrease the significance of the effect. The impact on investment incentives also depends on correlations between the underlying stochastic factors. The results may help investors to make informed investment decisions and policy makers to strategically design renewable support and develop tailor-made incentive schemes.

Two-sided Contracts for Difference (CfD) are a remuneration mechanism that stabilizes revenues and leads to better financing conditions for offshore wind farms. Despite the EU Commission’s efforts to make two-sided CfDs a mandatory remuneration scheme, many leading offshore wind markets in Europe still apply one-sided CfDs, which, combined with competitive auctions, often result in zero bids and merchant risk exposure. We contribute to the debate on the two-sided CfD effect on financing by quantifying their impact on debt size. Our approach combines a stochastic power price and wind-power feed-in model with cash flow liquidity management in a project financing setting. We show that offshore wind farms with two-sided CfDs experience less financial distress, increasing debt size between 15 and 27 percentage points compared to a project with merchant revenues. The leverage increase could save consumers between 12 and 19 EUR/MWh in electricity generation costs. This emphasizes the importance of continuing revenue stabilization measures to ensure a cost-effective mobilization of investments for financing Europe’s energy transition. JEL Classification: G32, G38, Q48, Q42

Two-sided Contracts for Difference (CfD) are a remuneration mechanism that stabilizes revenues and leads to better financing conditions for offshore wind farms. Despite the EU Commission’s efforts to make two-sided CfDs a mandatory remuneration scheme, many leading offshore wind markets in Europe still apply one-sided CfDs, which, combined with competitive auctions, often result in zero bids and merchant risk exposure. We contribute to the debate on the two-sided CfD effect on financing by quantifying their impact on debt size. Our approach combines a stochastic power price and wind-power feed-in model with cash flow liquidity management in a project financing setting. We show that offshore wind farms with two-sided CfDs experience less financial distress, increasing debt size between 15 and 27 percentage points compared to a project with merchant revenues. The leverage increase could save consumers between 12 and 19 EUR/MWh in electricity generation costs. This emphasizes the importance of continuing revenue stabilization measures to ensure a cost-effective mobilization of investments for financing Europe’s energy transition. JEL Classification: G32, G38, Q48, Q42