• Energy Research

Abstract Societies need to transition to renewable energy and eliminate fossil fuel use as soon as possible. However, policymakers have mostly neglected to consider that there is an array of possible energy transition pathways. Therefore, I offer a typology that envisions potential energy futures as falling along a two-dimensional model comprised of the structural organization of the social (political, economic, and civil) on one axis — on a spectrum of democratic versus monopolistic — and the scale of the energy system on the other — dichotomized as centralized versus decentralized. This typology suggests that there are four potential energy futures, which I term: (1) libertarian energy decentralism, (2) technocratic energy centralism, (3) democratic energy centralism, and (4) democratic energy decentralism. These four futures are not equal in terms of power, equity, and ecological impact. I argue that the democratization of the social is necessary to facilitate a “just transition,” but the scale of the energy system will also play a pivotal role in reinforcing and reproducing democratic and just social relations.

Abstract Societies need to transition to renewable energy and eliminate fossil fuel use as soon as possible. However, policymakers have mostly neglected to consider that there is an array of possible energy transition pathways. Therefore, I offer a typology that envisions potential energy futures as falling along a two-dimensional model comprised of the structural organization of the social (political, economic, and civil) on one axis — on a spectrum of democratic versus monopolistic — and the scale of the energy system on the other — dichotomized as centralized versus decentralized. This typology suggests that there are four potential energy futures, which I term: (1) libertarian energy decentralism, (2) technocratic energy centralism, (3) democratic energy centralism, and (4) democratic energy decentralism. These four futures are not equal in terms of power, equity, and ecological impact. I argue that the democratization of the social is necessary to facilitate a “just transition,” but the scale of the energy system will also play a pivotal role in reinforcing and reproducing democratic and just social relations.

Building on cornerstone traditions in historical sociology, as well as work in environmental sociology and political-economic sociology, we theorize and investigate with moderation analysis how and why national militaries shape the effect of economic growth on carbon pollution. Militaries exert a substantial influence on the production and consumption patterns of economies, and the environmental demands required to support their evolving infrastructure. As far-reaching and distinct characteristics of contemporary militarization, we suggest that both the size and capital intensiveness of the world’s militaries enlarge the effect of economic growth on nations’ carbon emissions. In particular, we posit that each increases the extent to which the other amplifies the effect of economic growth on carbon pollution. To test our arguments, we estimate longitudinal models of emissions for 106 nations from 1990 to 2016. Across various model specifications, robustness checks, a range of sensitivity analyses, and counterfactual analysis, the findings consistently support our propositions. Beyond advancing the environment and economic growth literature in sociology, this study makes significant contributions to sociological research on climate change and the climate crisis, and it underscores the importance of considering the military in scholarship across the discipline.

Building on cornerstone traditions in historical sociology, as well as work in environmental sociology and political-economic sociology, we theorize and investigate with moderation analysis how and why national militaries shape the effect of economic growth on carbon pollution. Militaries exert a substantial influence on the production and consumption patterns of economies, and the environmental demands required to support their evolving infrastructure. As far-reaching and distinct characteristics of contemporary militarization, we suggest that both the size and capital intensiveness of the world’s militaries enlarge the effect of economic growth on nations’ carbon emissions. In particular, we posit that each increases the extent to which the other amplifies the effect of economic growth on carbon pollution. To test our arguments, we estimate longitudinal models of emissions for 106 nations from 1990 to 2016. Across various model specifications, robustness checks, a range of sensitivity analyses, and counterfactual analysis, the findings consistently support our propositions. Beyond advancing the environment and economic growth literature in sociology, this study makes significant contributions to sociological research on climate change and the climate crisis, and it underscores the importance of considering the military in scholarship across the discipline.

Abstract Industry is the fastest growing sector of carbon dioxide emissions, as well as the single largest source of global greenhouse emissions. Industrial decarbonization policies have therefore emerged as critical components of any attempt to achieve net-zero energy transitions. However, little research has examined the effectiveness of those industrial decarbonization policies. We fill this gap by examining trends in industrial greenhouse gas emissions and whether industrial decarbonization policies (and particular policy instruments) are effective in reducing industrial sector emissions. We use panel data from 150 nations from 1990 to 2020 to examine the effect of industrial decarbonization policy instruments (drawing from an inventory of more than 700 policies across different countries) on industrial greenhouse gas emissions. We find that Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Cuba experienced the largest decreases in industrial emissions, whereas developing countries in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Kuwait experienced the greatest growth in emissions. We also find that industrial decarbonization policy leads to reductions in industrial greenhouse gas emissions, and that these effects are primarily driven by two policy types: (1) payments, finance, and taxation and (2) strategic plans. We also find some (but inconsistent) evidence that (1) regulation, (2) grants, (3) codes and standards, (4) minimum energy performance standards, (5) voluntary approaches, and (6) negotiated agreements (public–private sector) are associated with a reduction in emissions and that (1) payments and transfers, (2) information and education, and (3) targets, plans, and framework legislation may be associated with decreases or increases in emissions. By using dynamic modeling and event study approaches, we observe that the introduction of industrial decarbonization policy has persistent effects well into the future. The effect of each additional policy lasts between 4–19 years, and the effects of payments, finance, and taxation and strategic planning policies last between 4–18 years on average.

Abstract Industry is the fastest growing sector of carbon dioxide emissions, as well as the single largest source of global greenhouse emissions. Industrial decarbonization policies have therefore emerged as critical components of any attempt to achieve net-zero energy transitions. However, little research has examined the effectiveness of those industrial decarbonization policies. We fill this gap by examining trends in industrial greenhouse gas emissions and whether industrial decarbonization policies (and particular policy instruments) are effective in reducing industrial sector emissions. We use panel data from 150 nations from 1990 to 2020 to examine the effect of industrial decarbonization policy instruments (drawing from an inventory of more than 700 policies across different countries) on industrial greenhouse gas emissions. We find that Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Cuba experienced the largest decreases in industrial emissions, whereas developing countries in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Kuwait experienced the greatest growth in emissions. We also find that industrial decarbonization policy leads to reductions in industrial greenhouse gas emissions, and that these effects are primarily driven by two policy types: (1) payments, finance, and taxation and (2) strategic plans. We also find some (but inconsistent) evidence that (1) regulation, (2) grants, (3) codes and standards, (4) minimum energy performance standards, (5) voluntary approaches, and (6) negotiated agreements (public–private sector) are associated with a reduction in emissions and that (1) payments and transfers, (2) information and education, and (3) targets, plans, and framework legislation may be associated with decreases or increases in emissions. By using dynamic modeling and event study approaches, we observe that the introduction of industrial decarbonization policy has persistent effects well into the future. The effect of each additional policy lasts between 4–19 years, and the effects of payments, finance, and taxation and strategic planning policies last between 4–18 years on average.