• Energy Research

The first lesson to emerge from the recent auctions falls within a category that might be described as “higher costs of reforms in developing economies.” These range from bidders’ fears of future government-imposed price caps to technical issues, such as the potential loss of efficiency resulting from bidders’ lack of knowledge about ceiling prices, reference supply, and the demand reduction mechanism.

The first lesson to emerge from the recent auctions falls within a category that might be described as “higher costs of reforms in developing economies.” These range from bidders’ fears of future government-imposed price caps to technical issues, such as the potential loss of efficiency resulting from bidders’ lack of knowledge about ceiling prices, reference supply, and the demand reduction mechanism.

This paper examines the incentives embedded in different regulatory regimes for investment by utilities in energy efficiency programs that aim to reduce network losses. In our model, a monopolist chooses whether to undertake an investment in energy efficiency, which is not observable by the regulator. We show that, in equilibrium, the monopolist chooses to exert positive effort more often under price cap regulation than under no regulation or mandated target regulation and that she exerts no effort under rate of return regulation. This result contrasts with an extensive literature that focuses on end-user energy conservation and shows that price caps are ineffective for achieving energy efficiency as utilities have an incentive to maximize sales volume. Thus, policies that are designed to promote demand-side energy conservation may diminish the utilities’ incentives to pursue supply-side energy efficiency through minimizing network losses.

This paper examines the incentives embedded in different regulatory regimes for investment by utilities in energy efficiency programs that aim to reduce network losses. In our model, a monopolist chooses whether to undertake an investment in energy efficiency, which is not observable by the regulator. We show that, in equilibrium, the monopolist chooses to exert positive effort more often under price cap regulation than under no regulation or mandated target regulation and that she exerts no effort under rate of return regulation. This result contrasts with an extensive literature that focuses on end-user energy conservation and shows that price caps are ineffective for achieving energy efficiency as utilities have an incentive to maximize sales volume. Thus, policies that are designed to promote demand-side energy conservation may diminish the utilities’ incentives to pursue supply-side energy efficiency through minimizing network losses.

This paper reviews the incentives for pursuing a low-carbon electricity sector that are embedded in China's regulatory and policy framework. To do so, we first describe the industry structure and the regulatory framework. Second, we explicitly review the policies that were developed to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy. These policies range from the introduction of legal requirements to undertake particular actions to pricing mechanism and financial incentives. Based on this, we tease out the challenges faced by a sector governed by a myriad of complex arrangements, different institutions and agents who face different and often conflicting incentives for pursuing environmental and energy efficiency objectives. Finally, we provide suggestions to scientifically set up low-carbon policies and to achieve the expected goals with minimum social cost. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

This paper reviews the incentives for pursuing a low-carbon electricity sector that are embedded in China's regulatory and policy framework. To do so, we first describe the industry structure and the regulatory framework. Second, we explicitly review the policies that were developed to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy. These policies range from the introduction of legal requirements to undertake particular actions to pricing mechanism and financial incentives. Based on this, we tease out the challenges faced by a sector governed by a myriad of complex arrangements, different institutions and agents who face different and often conflicting incentives for pursuing environmental and energy efficiency objectives. Finally, we provide suggestions to scientifically set up low-carbon policies and to achieve the expected goals with minimum social cost. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

This paper estimates the price impacts of the unanticipated closure of Hazelwood, a large brown coal power plant (1600 MW) in Victoria, Australia. We measure the total impact of the closure on prices in Australia's National Electricity Market for each half-hour interval, and for each state, 12 months from closure. We also break down the impact into direct and indirect effects and find that the total impact of the closure on prices varies considerably across half-hours. The results vary not only in magnitude and across time, but also in statistical significance. Our estimates suggest an upper bound for the impact on the average half-hourly price of $24.02/MWh 12 months from closure, with a total market impact of $6,527.4 million. When we break down the total impact into direct and indirect effects, we find the latter to be the main driver of our results, through a reduction in the merit-order effect of wind generation.

This paper estimates the price impacts of the unanticipated closure of Hazelwood, a large brown coal power plant (1600 MW) in Victoria, Australia. We measure the total impact of the closure on prices in Australia's National Electricity Market for each half-hour interval, and for each state, 12 months from closure. We also break down the impact into direct and indirect effects and find that the total impact of the closure on prices varies considerably across half-hours. The results vary not only in magnitude and across time, but also in statistical significance. Our estimates suggest an upper bound for the impact on the average half-hourly price of $24.02/MWh 12 months from closure, with a total market impact of $6,527.4 million. When we break down the total impact into direct and indirect effects, we find the latter to be the main driver of our results, through a reduction in the merit-order effect of wind generation.

This is the first study to investigate and quantify the extent to which the 2015 reform has already impacted the economic and technical performance as well as the security of supply of China's electricity sector. We use provincial data from 2003 to 2018 to estimate the impacts of the reform on on-grid prices, average retail electricity prices (including those for households) and supply reliability. We adopt fixed effect models together with other dynamic panel data models. We find that the 2015 reform has already had a negative impact on on-grid prices of electricity generated from thermal energy and on overall average retail prices, but the impacts on other prices are not statistically significant. Our results also suggest that the 2015 reform has significantly induced improvement to technical efficiency, as measured by the coal burned per unit of thermal generation, but no impact on the line loss rate of electricity transmission. In addition, our empirical analysis suggests that the 2015 reform has reduced reliability and increased the instances of supply interruptions. These results are robust to different estimators and models. Finally, the effect of the reform is heterogeneous across regions. Our findings suggest that additional steps are needed to further improve the overall economic efficiency of the electricity sector in China, despite significant progress arising from the 2015 reform. The results may also provide useful lessons for other developing economies aiming to reform their power sectors and who are facing similar choices between the roles of the state and the market in ensuring efficient outcomes.