• Energy Research

Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement stand as milestone diplomatic achievements. However, immense discrepancies between political commitments and governmental action remain. Combined national climate commitments fall far short of the Paris Agreement's 1.5/2°C targets. Similar political ambition gaps persist across various areas of sustainable development. Many therefore argue that actions by nonstate actors, such as businesses and investors, cities and regions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are crucial. These voices have resonated across the United Nations (UN) system, leading to growing recognition, promotion, and mobilization of such actions in ever greater numbers. This article investigates optimistic arguments about nonstate engagement, namely: (a) “the more the better”; (b) “everybody wins”; (c) “everyone does their part”; and (d) “more brings more.” However, these optimistic arguments may not be matched in practice due to governance risks. The current emphasis on quantifiable impacts may lead to the under‐appreciation of variegated social, economic, and environmental impacts. Claims that everybody stands to benefit may easily be contradicted by outcomes that are not in line with priorities and needs in developing countries. Despite the seeming depoliticization of the role of nonstate actors in implementation, actions may still lead to politically contentious outcomes. Finally, nonstate climate and sustainability actions may not be self‐reinforcing but may heavily depend on supporting mechanisms. The article concludes with governance risk‐reduction strategies that can be combined to maximize nonstate potential in sustainable and climate‐resilient transformations.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Negative emissions technologies (NETs), especially bioenergy with carbon capture and storage and direct air capture and storage, have been invoked as necessary to achieve the aspirational 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement. However, currently their costs are estimated to be very high, NETs do not seem to offer co-benefits besides mitigating climate change and there are significant concerns regarding possible negative impacts of their large-scale implementation on sustainable development. Costs can vary significantly due to locational factors such as availability of biomass resources and geological storage capacity. It will be up to progressive industrialized countries to take first steps to mobilize the mitigation potential of NETs. In order to understand whether NETs can prov ide a significant contribution to mitigation, financial incentives are needed that allow implementing the most attractive NET activities at the global scale. We see the market mechanism under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement–colloquially called ‘Sustainable Development Mechanism’–as a possible cornerstone of such a policy instrument. While initially NETs will not be competitive on the free market, the mechanism can facilitate bilateral financial transfers for NETs, where mitigation units accrue to the financier. We discuss the functions and design elements that an international policy instrument may need to fulfil to successfully mobilize NETs. This includes in particular robust quantification of removed carbon under international oversight and preventing social and environmental conflicts particularly on land and water use by NETs to ensure long-term acceptability. Key policy insights International policy instruments that mobilize negative emissions technologies are inexistent despite most mitigation pathways relying on large-scale NETs implementation later this century. Feasibility of NETs at large-scale is highly uncertain due to high expected costs and political economy challenges. Practical experience is necessary for better understanding feasibility. For cost-effective global deployment of NETs, a policy instrument would need to mobilize international financial flows and implement safeguards concerning sustainable development impacts. The sustainable development mechanism established in Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement could be a good basis for this if it includes a robust approach to evaluating sustainable development impacts building on the sustainable development goals.

AbstractClimate change is a paradigmatic example of systemic risk. Recently, proposals for large‐scale interventions—carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM)—have started to redefine climate governance strategies. We describe how evolving modeling practices are trending toward optimized and “best‐case” projections—portraying deployment schemes that create both technically slanted and politically sanitized profiles of risk, as well as ideal objectives for CDR and SRM as mitigation‐enhancing, time‐buying mechanisms for carbon transitions or vulnerable populations. As promises, stylized and hopeful projections may selectively reinforce industry and political activities built around the inertia of the carbon economy. Some evidence suggests this is the emerging case for certain kinds of CDR, where the prospect of future carbon capture substitutes for present mitigation. Either of these implications are systemic: explorations of climatic futures may entrench certain carbon infrastructures. We point out efforts and recommendations to forestall this trend in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, by creating more stakeholder input and strengthening political realism in modeling and other assessments, as well as through policy guardrails.