• Energy Research

AbstractThe efficient use of market-based policy instruments is an area of increasing importance as scholars and policymakers work to balance effective climate policy with economic growth. Carbon allowances and carbon offsets, despite being statutorily substitutable, behave in practice like imperfect substitutes. This paper provides a synthesis of extant work, market data and the regulatory frameworks of the world’s major carbon markets, and provides a comprehensive assessment of the drivers of demand for carbon offsets. It also provides a detailed assessment of the process through which international carbon offsets are produced, the UN’s Clean Development Mechanism. Demand for carbon offsets is heavily influenced by key programme design parameters that are specific to carbon market design and its implementation. These design parameters heavily influence the degree to which transaction costs, regulatory uncertainty and risk factor into the decisions of firms operating within the carbon trading programme. This paper also identifies key extra-statutory drivers that are outside of the policymaker’s control, which should be considered in both the policy design and the implementation process. This paper provides an instructive set of guiding criteria for policymakers and scholars for the design of future market-based environmental policy.

This paper provides a meta-analysis of a broad set of recent studies of the economic impacts of climate change mitigation policies. It evaluates the influences of the impacts of causal factors, key economic assumptions and macroeconomic linkages on the outcome of these studies. A quantile regression analysis is also performed on the meta sample, to evaluate the robustness of those key factors throughout the full range of macro findings. Results of these analyses suggest that study results are strongly driven by data inputs, economic assumptions and modeling approaches. However, they are sometimes affected in counterintuitive ways.

AbstractMany critical infrastructure services operate under either price regulation or deregulated systems. The grand policy experiment of deregulation has been heavily studied, but evaluations have been limited at the retail level where end‐user prices are often difficult to obtain. This paper presents an in‐depth look at the retail market for electricity in a retail deregulated, or restructured, market—Ohio. We build and introduce a comprehensive SQL database of every daily filed retail electricity offer over a 9‐year period of study, over two‐million records. We integrate this data with other external data sources and conduct a detailed descriptive analysis of market prices as observed by end consumers at the retail level. We find that the lion's share of “competitive” retail electricity choice offers are more costly to consumers than the utility's default service rate and have higher markups over the wholesale price, and we find that when prices exceed the default rate they do so by a considerably larger margin than when consumers observe savings. We also find that even well‐informed consumers are able to find a welfare‐improving rate relative to the default rate between only 43% and 59% of the time. We conclude with a discussion of implications and root economic causes of the efficiency and consumer welfare problems we observe.

This paper examines the governance challenges of intersectoral critical infrastructure interdependencies. Between 2015 and 2017, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supported a team of researchers at Northeastern University and The Ohio State University to evaluate critical infrastructure interdependencies between the energy and transportation sectors in the context of a potential hurricane event in the Boston metro region. The paper reports on 2 years of semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and infrastructure operators. The results provide insights gained from the interviews and a workshop convened jointly by Northeastern University, the Boston Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management, and the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. Research relating to the resilience of interdependent critical infrastructure has proliferated in recent years. Nearly all of this research involves analysis of secondary data or abstracted operational models, rather than in-depth interviews of on-the-ground infrastructure owners and operators. This paper identifies a number of important constraints that undermine critical infrastructure resilience. At its core, infrastructure resilience is less a question of managerial desire or skill, or technical resources or design, but is a larger institutional challenge. The institutional environment in which energy and transportation infrastructure operates ultimately informs and defines resilience efforts.

State and regional governments in the U.S. and abroad are looking to market-based approaches to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions from the electric sector, and in the U.S. as a compliance approach to meeting the aggressive targets of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s Clean Power Plan. Auction-based approaches, like those used in the Northeast U.S. and California, are both recommended strategies under the Plan and attractive to state governments because they can generate significant revenue from the sale of emissions permits. However, given the nature of imperfect competition in existing electricity markets, particularly at the state and regional level, the issue of market power is a concern at the forefront. This paper provides the results from a controlled laboratory experiment of an auction-based emissions market in the electricity sector. The results show that government revenue from auctioning emissions permits is substantially lower when market concentration is only moderately increased. The results hold significant implications for states and other subnational governments that have high revenue expectations from the auctioning of emissions permits.

Abstract This paper provides an experimental analysis of a simultaneous energy-emissions market under conditions of market power. The experimental design employs real-world institutional features; including stochastic demand, permit banking, inter-temporal (multi-round) dynamics, a tightening cap, and resale. The results suggest that dominant firms can utilize energy-emissions market linkages to simultaneously inflate the price of energy and suppress the price of emissions allowances. Whereas under prior market designs, regulators were concerned with dominant firms exercising their market power over the emissions market to exclude rivals and manipulate the permit market by hoarding permits; the results of this paper suggest that this strategy is less profitable to dominant firms in contemporary auction-based markets than strategic capacity withholding in the energy market and associated demand reduction in the emissions market.

Retail electric deregulation has been identified in the literature to have favorable price impacts to businesses and households because of the introduction of competition into rate-setting. Those studies often ignore the important role of regulatory intervention. They are also generally national or multi-state aggregated studies that ignore state- and utility-specific dynamics, and most rely on Energy Information Administration (EIA) price data that does not account for riders and surcharges on consumer bills, which can total more than 60 percent of bills. Using a unique panel of representative, complete electricity bill data from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), this paper provides a multi-utility panel regression analysis of the effect of retail deregulation on total electric bills in Ohio. The results identify two main sources of cross-subsidization that have generally cancelled out the favorable effects of restructuring. Both types of cross-subsidies result in substantial burden shifts to residential consumers.

Abstract Unlike other auction-based carbon emission markets, California's carbon market (AB32) utilizes a consignment auction design in which utilities are allocated a share of emissions permits that they must sell into the uniform-price auction. Auction revenue is returned to the consignee, which creates an incentive to increase the auction clearing price through strategic bidding. In a numerical example, we identify the incentive that consignees have to overstate their quantity demanded in the auction, since this increases the probability that the auction clears at a higher price. This results in inefficient allocations and inflated auction prices. We test this effect through a series of laboratory experiments and confirm these predictions. Findings indicate that short-run firm profits are lower in a consignment auction than in a non-consignment auction market, and that firms are more likely to not receive the quantity of permits they need for program compliance in the auction. We conclude with implications for the design and modification of future Coasian markets.