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This forum article outlines a research agenda focused on linkages between the UNFCCC and other governance arrangements that also address climate change. We take as our point of departure the recognition that the UNFCCC is no longer the sole site of global climate change governance, and thus the types of linkage across what we call the global climate governance landscape including as a central node the UNFCCC are important for thinking through how improved global responses to climate change may be pursued. The forum identifies two specific types of linkage: division-of-labor linkages and catalytic linkages. We illustrate these with some examples and raise questions we believe would be useful to pursue in future research.

ABSTRACTHow and why do institutional architectures, and the roles of private institutions therein, differ across separate areas of climate governance? Here, institutional complexity is explained in terms of the problem-structural characteristics of an issue area and the associated demand for, and supply of, private authority. These characteristics can help explain the degree of centrality of intergovernmental institutions, as well as the distribution of governance functions between these and private governance institutions. This framework is applied to three emerging areas of climate governance: reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) and climate engineering. Conflicts over means and values, as well as over relatively and absolutely assessed goods, lead to considerable variations in the emergence and roles of private institutions across these three cases.

Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement stand as milestone diplomatic achievements. However, immense discrepancies between political commitments and governmental action remain. Combined national climate commitments fall far short of the Paris Agreement's 1.5/2°C targets. Similar political ambition gaps persist across various areas of sustainable development. Many therefore argue that actions by nonstate actors, such as businesses and investors, cities and regions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are crucial. These voices have resonated across the United Nations (UN) system, leading to growing recognition, promotion, and mobilization of such actions in ever greater numbers. This article investigates optimistic arguments about nonstate engagement, namely: (a) “the more the better”; (b) “everybody wins”; (c) “everyone does their part”; and (d) “more brings more.” However, these optimistic arguments may not be matched in practice due to governance risks. The current emphasis on quantifiable impacts may lead to the under‐appreciation of variegated social, economic, and environmental impacts. Claims that everybody stands to benefit may easily be contradicted by outcomes that are not in line with priorities and needs in developing countries. Despite the seeming depoliticization of the role of nonstate actors in implementation, actions may still lead to politically contentious outcomes. Finally, nonstate climate and sustainability actions may not be self‐reinforcing but may heavily depend on supporting mechanisms. The article concludes with governance risk‐reduction strategies that can be combined to maximize nonstate potential in sustainable and climate‐resilient transformations.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

The debate about post-2012 global climate governance has been framed largely by proponents and opponents of the policymaking process established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In light of the proliferation of institutions governing some aspects of climate change, analysts have asked whether a centralized or a polycentric climate governance architecture will be more effective, efficient, equitable, or viable. While these are valid questions, they obscure the fact that global climate governance is already polycentric, or rather: fragmented. This paper argues that the more pertinent questions are how to sensibly link the different elements of global climate governance, and what the role of the UNFCCC could be in this regard. We examine these two questions for three aspects of global climate governance: international climate technology initiatives; emerging emissions trading systems; and unilateral trade measures. The paper shows that there are strong arguments for coordination in all of these cases, and illustrates the possible role of the UNFCCC. It concludes, however, that possibilities for coordination will eventually be limited by underlying tensions that will plague any future climate governance architecture.

To achieve the long-term temperature goals set by the 2015 Paris Agreement and avert climate disruption, fossil fuel production cannot continue to proceed unabated. This dawning realisation has led to calls to ‘leave fossil fuels in the ground’. While a growing body of scholarship on ‘supply-side climate policies’ shows how policies curbing fossil fuel production can contribute to climate objective, there has been scarce attention to the role of law in regulating fossil fuel production. With a view to filling this gap, this article investigates the changing role of international law in addressing fossil fuel production to achieve climate change goals. The limitations of the siloed thinking in international law are illustrated with reference to international climate change law, human rights law, and investment law. The normative guidance emerging from these bodies of law for governments and fossil fuel companies regarding the transition away from fossil fuel production is unclear, and at times conflicting. The article thus calls for a rethinking of international law in supporting the shift away from fossil fuel production to achieve climate goals.

The EU Emissions Trading Directive is expected by European energy-intensive industries to harm their competitiveness vis-à-vis non-European competitors. Many additional measures have thus been proposed to 'level the playing field' and to protect the competitiveness of European energy-intensive industries within the larger effort of reducing Europe's greenhouse gas emissions and of meeting its obligations under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. This article evaluates a range of proposed measures based on a set of political and legal criteria, including environmental effectiveness; the need to consider differentiated commitments, responsibilities and capabilities; conformity with world trade law and European Union law; and Europe's overall political interests. We discuss measures that could be adopted by the European Union and its member states, such as direct support for energy-intensive industries, restrictions of energy-intensive imports into the European Union through border cost adjustments, quotas or technical regulations, and cost reimbursement for affected developing countries. We also analyse measures available to multilateral institutions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol and the World Trade Organisation. We conclude with a classification of the discussed measures with red (unfeasible), yellow (potentially feasible) or green (feasible) labels. © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Most research on global governance has focused either on theoretical accounts of the overall phenomenon or on empirical studies of distinct institutions that serve to solve particular governance challenges. In this article we analyze instead “governance architectures,” defined as the overarching system of public and private institutions, principles, norms, regulations, decision-making procedures and organizations that are valid or active in a given issue area of world politics. We focus on one aspect that is turning into a major source of concern for scholars and policy-makers alike: the “fragmentation” of governance architectures in important policy domains. The article offers a typology of different degrees of fragmentation, which we describe as synergistic, cooperative, and conflictive fragmentation. We then systematically assess alternative hypotheses over the relative advantages and disadvantages of different degrees of fragmentation. We argue that moderate degrees of fragmentation may entail both significant costs and benefits, while higher degrees of fragmentation are likely to decrease the overall performance of a governance architecture. The article concludes with policy options on how high degrees of fragmentation could be reduced. Fragmentation is prevalent in particular in the current governance of climate change, which we have hence chosen as illustration for our discussion.