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Industrial symbiosis (IS) is recognized as an effective practice to support circular economy and sustainable development because it is able to enhance the technical efficiency of production processes, provided IS relationships among companies remain active over the long period. However, although it has been established that IS relationships can be vulnerable to disruptive events that reduce the willingness of companies to cooperate in IS synergies, to date few contributions to the literature focus attention on the events which lead firms to interrupt IS synergies. This paper contributes to the existing literature firstly by highlighting the disruptive events affecting the willingness of companies to cooperate in IS synergies and their causes, and secondly by developing an analytical model to assess the impact of each disruption on physical and monetary flows created among companies by the IS relationship. Specifically, an enterprise input-output (EIO) model is proposed, aimed at mapping the physical and monetary flows resulting from IS synergies among companies. Through this model, disruptive events can be modeled and their impact on the above-mentioned flows can be assessed. A numerical case example illustrates how the model works and how company managers and IS facilitators could use it to evaluate to what degree their current IS relationships may be vulnerable to perturbations. The model could therefore facilitate the design of adequate countermeasures and contribute to the development of perturbation resilient IS relationships. Furthermore, policymakers could adopt the model when designing policy actions to support IS practice.

In many industries, an increasing number of firm owners tie managers’ incentives to sustainability investments. Positive rewards directly increase a manager's total pay when that manager makes sustainability investments, whereas negative rewards directly decrease a manager's pay when those investments are made. Strategic incentive design literature posits that such organizational choices also affect the decisions of a firm's competitors. This paper uses a game-theoretic framework to analyze the effects of sustainability incentives in a setting with two competing firms. In contrast to the existing literature, in the current paper sustainability investments have a demand-enhancing effect and can increase or decrease the unit cost of production, making the current framework more in line with industrial practice. The results show that a firm invests in sustainability only if the demand-enhancing effects outweigh the cost-increasing effects. More importantly, positively rewarding managers for sustainability investments is done in equilibrium only if the innovation capability of the firm is sufficiently high. However, in terms of profits, those positive rewards lead to a prisoner's dilemma. When innovation capability is lower, firm owners use negative rewards and raise their profits. Another finding is that rival firms that cooperate in determining their sustainability incentives increase their profits but do so using negative rewards. These results, which have not been reported in the literature, point to some critical trade-offs in terms of sustainability investments and firm profits when sustainability incentives are considered and are both managerially and academically relevant.