In France, spending on the financial remuneration of politicians comes in at more than a billion euros in per year. These costs associated with political work are regularly subject to sharp criticism, which accuses elected representatives of costing too much and putting their own financial interests first. The ELUAR project looks to break with common, all-embracing representations and examine in detail the role played by financial remunerations in the process of the professionalization of elected representatives. From a scientific point of view, it seeks to fill in a gap in the French literature about political work. Although many publications have appeared about this subject since the 1990s, the analysis of the material conditions of the exercise of mandates remains a blind sport for research in France. Through an interdisciplinary approach which mobilises sociology, political science, history and law, this collective research project aims to put the financial dimension back at the centre of the analysis of careers and engagements of national and local political personnel. The central hypothesis of the project is to highlight heterogeneity and inequality in the remuneration of elected representatives and in the forms of political professionalization. Practically speaking, the project is structured around two parts. The first part centres around the study of the production of reforms and judicial frameworks in order to bring up to date the political construction of economic hierarchisation between mandates. Which actors are invested in the production of reforms? What registers have been used to justify these reforms since the 1950s? How does the principle of accumulating mandates affect these games? What are the possibilities for remuneration and material gratification open to the politicians? Do the same logics of hierarchisation apply abroad? The second part analyses the uses and appropriations of the rules which frame the remuneration of elected representatives. By focusing on remuneration, and more largely on the material conditions in which mandates are exercised, this study will lead to a better understanding of the variety of contemporary forms of political professionalization, and the subjective relations that the elected representations have with money and the political uses of money. By what processes do elected representatives manage to abandon their initial profession in favour of a political mandate? What strategies of economic reassurance do they deploy? How are allowances and bonuses attributed? Does money win the loyalty of political teams? Is it constructed as a political arm to disqualify an opponent? These are just some of the questions that will be dealt with in the second part. Ultimately, the project ELUAR seeks to make a double break, firstly with ordinary discourses which homogenise elected representatives and are suspicious about remunerations they receive; and secondly with the scholarly point of view visible in research on political work, which posits that compensation makes more or less mechanically the professional.