FAERE Working Paper, 2019.23 ; While environmental values are spreading among societies, theyhardly lead to effective political actions. This may be due to an overestimation of the sharing of those values among people, or to a lack ofpolitical power of environmentalists vis-à-vis materialist citizens. Wepropose a theoretical model to investigate these two channels, based ona setup a la Grossman and Helpman (1994), in which lobby is a strategy available to social groups, in order to influence the government onenvironmental taxes. Because societies have being historically markedby materialist habits, citizens sharing those habits face lower costswhen getting organized. By considering endogenous lobby formation ala Mitra (1999), we show that, in order for environmental and materialist lobbies to coexist, the society must be mixed enough. Based on adynamic framework a la Besley and Persson (2019), we investigate howsocial values change over time. Whenever lobbying by materialists prevails, a unique social equilibrium exists, featuring a stable hegemonyby materialist values. If environmentalists get organized too, a secondsocial equilibrium emerges, that is locally stable and more favorableto them. However, the threshold might be very high, above which thecultural transition effectively takes off. By calibrating the model, westudy counter-acting forces allowing to improve the odds of the environmental transition, such as cultural mutations, social-signaling, andlowering organizational costs. Finally, we provide policy implications. ; Alors que les valeurs environnementales se répandent dans les sociétés, elles ne débouchent guère sur des actions politiques efficaces. Cela peut être dû à une surestimation du partage de ces valeurs entre les gens, ou à un manque de pouvoir politique des écologistes vis-à-vis des citoyens matérialistes. Nous proposons un modèle théorique pour investiguer ces deux canaux, basé sur un cadre à la Grossman et Helpman (1994), dans lequel le lobbying est une stratégie à la disposition des ...