This dissertation examines the impacts of the 1973 Arab petrostate oil embargo on U.S. energy politics. I argue that the embargo was the moment that transformed oil from a domestic and highly regulated commodity into a matter of national security and competitive geopolitics. While its likelihood was foreseen by the Nixon Administration, the embargo did exacerbate an existing energy crisis that was caused by pre-embargo federal energy policies. Following the embargo, a dominant narrative emerged that viewed dependence on foreign oil supplies as an existential threat that merited extraordinary government measures. The securitization of the energy crisis allowed the Nixon Administration to implement many of its pre-embargo energy policies, including the launch of a national energy program to bring the U.S. to energy self-sufficiency by 1980. The embargo was the trigger for the creation of new governmental entities, such as the Department of Energy and U.S. Central Command, that endure to this day. It also shaped the U.S.'s close relationship with Saudi Arabia as an essential oil supplier and a key ally in the Arab world. The dissertation contests the revisionist accounts that argue that the embargo was a non-event, arguing that its impacts on U.S. domestic and foreign policies are still tangible and relevant. Doctor of Philosophy For most countries, ensuring energy security and uninterrupted oil supplies is a matter of national security and economic survival. However, for the U.S., long a major oil exporter, access to energy resources only rose to the status of a national security issue in the early 1970s. This dissertation examines the impacts of the 1973 Arab petrostate oil embargo on U.S. energy politics. I argue that the embargo was the moment that transformed oil from a domestic and highly regulated commodity into a matter of national security and competitive geopolitics. Pre-embargo rising domestic demand for oil, insufficient domestic supplies, and misdirected federal regulations had already weakened the resilience of the U.S. oil market and caused shortages. Following the embargo, the Nixon Administration launched a national program to achieve energy self-sufficiency by 1980. I argue that the value of committing the U.S. to energy autarky was essential for conveying to foes and allies that the Nixon Administration was willing to invest in a very costly national program so that it can maintain the autonomy of both its foreign policy and of the economy. I also argue that racial and cultural prejudices influenced the Nixon Administration's reaction to the embargo, in that throughout the ramp-up and during the post-embargo period, both the media and the Nixon Administration expressed disbelief at the effrontery of underdeveloped countries that were until recently Western possessions to challenge a global superpower. Following the embargo, a dominant narrative emerged that viewed dependence on foreign oil supplies as an existential threat that merited extraordinary government measures. The securitization of the energy crisis allowed the Nixon Administration to implement many of its pre-embargo energy policies. The embargo was the trigger for the creation of new governmental entities, such as the Department of Energy and U.S. Central Command, that endure to this day. It also shaped the U.S.'s close relationship with Saudi Arabia as an essential oil supplier and a key ally in the Arab world.