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Incentive mechanisms to prevent efficiency loss of non-profit utilities

The modernization of the power system introduces technologies that may improve the system's efficiency by enhancing the capabilities of users. Despite their potential benefits, such technologies can have a negative impact. This subject has widely analyzed, mostly considering for-profit electric utilities. However, the literature has a gap regarding the impact of new technologies on non-profit utilities. In this work, we quantify the price of anarchy of non-profit utilities, that is, the cost caused by lack of coordination of users. We find that users, in the worst case, can consume up to twice the optimal demand, obtaining a small fraction of the optimal surplus. For this reason, we leverage the theory of mechanism design to design an incentive scheme that reduces the inefficiencies of the system, which preserves the privacy of users. We illustrate with simulations the efficiency loss of the system and show two instances of incentive mechanism that satisfy either budget balance and budget deficit.
17 pages, 3 figures, accepted in the International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems
- National University of Colombia Colombia
- National University of Colombia Colombia
- Universidad de San Buenaventura, Bogota Colombia
- Universidad de San Buenaventura, Bogota Colombia
- Vanderbilt University United States
FOS: Computer and information sciences, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, FOS: Electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, Systems and Control (eess.SY), Electrical Engineering and Systems Science - Systems and Control, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
FOS: Computer and information sciences, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, FOS: Electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, Systems and Control (eess.SY), Electrical Engineering and Systems Science - Systems and Control, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
citations This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).7 popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.Top 10% influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).Average impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.Average
