Abstract Remanufacturing as a cleaner-production means has attracted much attention because of its great potential benefits in economics and ecology. This study introduces a new two-echelon remanufacturing supply chain motivated by the practice. Different from the existing research, interactive production constraints (IPCs) are involved between a manufacturer's and a core remanufacturer's production. In this supply chain, the manufacturer produces new and remanufactured products, whereas the core remanufacturer recycles used products and makes remanufactured cores. A four-step Stackelberg game model is developed to investigate the two firms' interactive decisions with IPCs. Analytical results show that, the core remanufacturer cannot fully satisfy the manufacturer's demand with adequate remanufactured cores when the transaction price is at a low level, conversely, the manufacturer can not accept all remanufactured cores that the core remanufacturer is supplying due to IPCs. IPCs significantly influence the firms' decisions and the supply chain's performance. To improve the supply chain's performance, we propose a cross-advertisement policy that offers the firms with initiatives on interactive decisions when facing IPCs. We find that either the manufacturer's environmental advertisements on used-product returns or the core remanufacturer's environmental advertisements on remanufactured-product consumption can benefit the two firms in terms of profits and the supply chain in terms of environmental performance.