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Abstract This paper provides the first estimates of China's global developmental finance institutions in general and China's policy bank lending to foreign governments for energy in particular. According to the China Global Energy Finance database, between 2000 and 2017, China Development Bank (CDB) and China Export-Import Bank (CHEXIM) provided $225.75 billion in overseas energy development finance. We find that: China's ‘policy banks’ and funds have doubled the availability of global development finance –and hold more assets than the major Western-backed MDBs operating in developing countries. With the onset of a new family of funds and multilateral development banks co-financed by China, China is poised to be the largest development lender in the world as Western-backed MDBs appear stagnated in their ability to increase their capital bases. China's global energy portfolio is heavily exposed to country, macroeconomic, climate, and social risks, however. To mitigate such risks and meet the broader sustainable development challenge for the 21st Century, China's development finance will need to shift the composition of its global energy lending in a significant manner.

In this paper we investigate the prospects for the large-scale use of low-emission energy technologies in Africa. Many African countries have recently experienced substantial economic growth and aim at fulfilling much of the energy needs associated with continuing along paths of economic expansion by exploiting their large domestic potentials of renewable forms of energy. Important benefits of the abundant renewable energy resources in Africa are that they allow for stimulating economic development, increasing energy access and alleviating poverty, while simultaneously avoiding emissions of greenhouse gases. In this study we analyse what the likely energy demand in Africa could be until 2050, and inspect multiple scenarios for the concomitant levels of greenhouse gas emissions and emission intensities. We use the TIAM-ECN model for our study, which enawbbles detailed energy systems research through a technology-rich cost-minimisation procedure. The results from our analysis fully support an Africa-led effort to substantially enhance the use of the continent's renewable energy potential. But they suggest that the current aim of achieving 300 GW of additional renewable electricity generation capacity by 2030 is perhaps unrealistic, even given high GDP and population growth: we find figures that are close to half this level. On the other hand, we find evidence for leap-frogging opportunities, by which renewable energy options rather than fossil fuels could constitute the cost-optimal solution to fulfil most of Africa's growing energy requirements. An important benefit of leap-frogging is that it avoids an ultimately expensive fossil fuels lock-in that would fix the carbon footprint of the continent until at least the middle of the century.

In 2014, the Portuguese government appointed a Commission for Environmental Tax Reform that formulated a carbon-tax proposal designed to achieve three dividends: to help Portugal meet the European Union's target for emissions reductions by 2030, to boost long-term employment and GDP above their pre-carbon-tax levels, and to strengthen public finances by lowering public indebtedness. A key feature of this proposal was a judicious set of mixed strategies to recycle all carbon-tax revenues back into the economy. In this note, we show how the carbon tax that the Portuguese Parliament eventually approved deviated from such guidelines, and ultimately failed to achieve the triple dividend. We argue that authorities need to quickly amend the existing legislation to avoid this misguided attempt turning into a missed opportunity to improve environmental, macroeconomic, and fiscal outcomes.

The dramatically increasing population of Asia necessitates equally as dramatic increase in energy supply to meet demand. Rapidly increasing energy demand is a major concern for Asian countries because the increase in demand is being met through the increased use of fossil fuel supply, largely domestic coal and imported fuel. Renewable energy supply presents a lower emission pathway that could be a viable option for steering off the higher emissions path. However, several market, economic, institutional, technical, and socio-cultural barriers hinder countries in moving from high to low emission pathway. Following a discussion on the rising demand for energy in Asia and the prospects of partly satisfying it with renewable energy, we outline the reasons for government support to tackle the barriers for widespread diffusion of grid-based renewable energy. Additionally, we also discuss workable models for strategic government intervention to support diffusion of grid-based renewable energy in Asia.

In a world that increasingly invites private actors to address social needs, there has been a rise of social enterprises in a variety of sectors, including new and renewable energy. As of yet, little research has focused on how these enterprises interact with government policy in low- and middle-income countries. This research specifically explores how social enterprises operating in rural India with decentralized renewable energy solutions seek to access government support, and what strategies they adopt to engage with the government. An inductive theory-building approach was adopted to explore this and advance current knowledge in the boundaries of social entrepreneurship and policy. We propose ‘Engagement’ and ‘Disengagement’ as the two strategies used by social enterprises in this context in accessing government support and policy. ‘Engagement’ is a strategy comprising of the tactics: (a) Leveraging Policy, (b) Building and Leveraging Relationships, (c) Lobbying, and (d) Monitoring. ‘Disengagement’ is a strategy comprising of the tactics: (a) Avoiding Government Presence, and (b) Disengagement from Policy.

Abstract The resource curse is sometimes associated with poor resource-rich countries. However, using panel evidence from the United States, we find that the resource curse is also prevalent in a wealthy resource-rich country. This study investigates the impact of oil resources on income inequality, with a particular focus on distinguishing between the effects from oil abundance (i.e. production) versus oil dependency (i.e. consumption). We observe contrasting non-monotonic outcomes from oil abundance in comparison to oil dependency. For oil abundance, states with low oil production will have less inequality if they increase oil production, and states with high oil production will have increased income inequality if they increase production. The opposite holds true for oil dependency. The findings suggest several channels of concern. For example, oil-rich states are more vulnerable to rent-seeking behaviour as oil production and oil revenues increase, which can adversely affect the income distribution gap. On the other hand, oil-dependent states are more likely to be affected by commodity price shocks which can increase income inequality.

The bulk of rural populations in sub-Saharan Africa have no access to electricity and are under-served by any other form of modern infrastructure. The cost of infrastructure to mainly scattered communities has been perennially cited as largely to blame. This is an undeniable truth, but only part of it. There are in addition, myriads of social, economic and political obstacles that play an unquantified and frequently unrecognized negative role. At the route of the problem lies a subdued role of the would-be recipients who in fact, unlike anybody else, are conversant with their problems. Consequently, a number of products may come as impositions or misplaced priorities. Consumer participation for sustainable development has been articulated at international forums and in publications as being advantageous. In practice however, the concept appears to be generally shunned and even when, occasionally, tried the needs of the consumers are presumed and their roles prescribed. This paper discusses a range of social, economic and political issues that constitute major obstacles to the realisation of sustainable rural development.

Climate change is unique among the consequences of fossil fuel burning in its far reaching impact, both spatially and temporally. Earlier studies estimate the aggregated monetized damage due to climate change at 1.5 to 2.0% of world GDP (for 2 × CO2); the OECD would lose 1.0 to 1.5% of GDP; the developing countries 2.0 to 9.0%, according to these estimates. These figures are not comprehensive and highly uncertain. Newer studies increasingly emphasize adaptation, variability, extreme events, other (non-climate change) stress factors and the need for integrated assessment of damages. As a result, differences in impacts between regions and sectors have increased, the market impacts in developed countries tended to fall, and non-market impacts have become increasingly important. Marginal damages are more interesting from a policy point of view. Earlier estimates range from about US$5 to US$125 per tonne of carbon, with most estimates at the lower end of this range. These figures are based on polynomial functions in the level of climate change, but the rate of change may be equally important, as are the speed of adaptation, restoration and value adjustment. Furthermore, future vulnerability to climate change will be different from current vulnerability. On the whole, the market impacts fall (relatively) with economic growth while the non-market impacts rise (relatively) with growth.