• Energy Research
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Small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) offer the promise of providing carbon-free electricity and heat to small islands or isolated electricity grids. However, the economic feasibility of SMRs is highly system-dependent and has not been studied in this context. We selected three case-study islands for such an evaluation: Jeju, Tasmania and Tenerife based on their system complexity. We generated 100,000 electricity-mix cases stochastically for each island and examined the system-level generation-cost changes by incrementing the average generation cost of SMRs from USD$60 to 200 MWh−1. SMRs were found to be economically viable when average generation cost was <$100 MWh−1 for Jeju and <$140 MWh−1 for Tenerife. For Tasmania the situation was complex; hydroelectric power is an established competitor, but SMRs might be complementary in a future “battery of the nation” scenario where most of the island’s hydro capacity was exported to meet peak power demand on the mainland grid. The higher average generation cost of SMRs makes it difficult for them to compete economically with a fossil fuel/renewable mix in many contexts. However, we have demonstrated that SMRs can be an economically viable carbon-free option for a small island with a limited land area and high energy demand.

AbstractA large and growing market exists for the management of used nuclear fuel. Urgent need for service lies in Asia, also the region of the fastest growth in fossil fuel consumption. A logical potential provider of this service is acknowledged to be Australia. We describe and assess a service combining approved multinational storage with an advanced fuel reconditioning facility and commercialisation of advanced nuclear reactor technologies. We estimate that this project has the potential to deliver a net present value of (2015) AU$30.9 billion. This economic finding compares favourably with recent assessment based on deep geological repository. Providing service for used nuclear fuel and commercialisation of next generation nuclear technology would catalyse the expansion of nuclear technology for energy requirements across Asia and beyond, aiding efforts to combat climate change. Pathways based on leveraging advanced nuclear technologies are therefore worthy of consideration in the development of policy in this area.

There is wide public debate about which electricity generating technologies will best be suited to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Sometimes this debate ignores real-world practicalities and leads to over-optimistic conclusions. Here we define and apply a set of fit-for-service criteria to identify technologies capable of supplying baseload electricity and reducing GHGs by amounts and within the timescale set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Only five current technologies meet these criteria: coal (both pulverised fuel and integrated gasification combined cycle) with carbon capture and storage (CCS); combined cycle gas turbine with CCS; Generation III nuclear fission; and solar thermal backed by heat storage and gas turbines. To compare costs and performance, we undertook a meta-review of authoritative peer-reviewed studies of levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) and life-cycle GHG emissions for these technologies. Future baseload electricity technology selection will be influenced by the total cost of technology substitution, including carbon pricing, which is synergistically related to both LCOE and emissions. Nuclear energy is the cheapest option and best able to meet the IPCC timetable for GHG abatement. Solar thermal is the most expensive, while CCS will require rapid major advances in technology to meet that timetable.

Abstract Rising crop production over the last half century has had far-reaching consequences for human welfare and the environment. With food demand projected to rise, one of the central challenges in minimizing agriculture’s impacts on the climate and biodiversity is to increase crop production with higher yields rather than more cropland. However, quantifying progress is challenging. When analyzed at the most aggregated, global level, yields can be defined as the total crop output per unit area per year, but aggregate yields are driven by multiple factors, only some of which have a clear relationship to improved agricultural production. To date, there is no research that simultaneously determines how much of rising crop production has been met by rising aggregate yields versus cropland expansion, while also quantifying the unique contribution of each yield driver. Using LMDI decomposition analysis, we find that rising aggregate yields contributed far more than cropland expansion (89% compared to 11%). That is, growing global food demand has by and large been met by growing more crops on the same amount of land, rather than expanding cropland. Our second-stage decomposition showed that nearly two-thirds of aggregate yield improvements have come from pure yield, or the output of a given crop per unit of harvested cropland area in a given country per unit area per year. The remainder has come from less-discussed drivers of aggregate yields, including cropping intensity, changes in the geographic distribution of cropland, and crop composition. Further, we use attribution analysis to show the contributions to different decomposition factors from countries grouped by climate, income, and region, as well as from different crops. Such granular yet comprehensive breakdowns of crop production and aggregate yields offer more accurate forecasts and can help focus policies on the most promising levers to meet rising food demand sustainably.

There is an ongoing debate about the deployment rates and composition of alternative energy plans that could feasibly displace fossil fuels globally by mid-century, as required to avoid the more extreme impacts of climate change. Here we demonstrate the potential for a large-scale expansion of global nuclear power to replace fossil-fuel electricity production, based on empirical data from the Swedish and French light water reactor programs of the 1960s to 1990s. Analysis of these historical deployments show that if the world built nuclear power at no more than the per capita rate of these exemplar nations during their national expansion, then coal- and gas-fired electricity could be replaced worldwide in less than a decade. Under more conservative projections that take into account probable constraints and uncertainties such as differing relative economic output across regions, current and past unit construction time and costs, future electricity demand growth forecasts and the retiring of existing aging nuclear plants, our modelling estimates that the global share of fossil-fuel-derived electricity could be replaced within 25-34 years. This would allow the world to meet the most stringent greenhouse-gas mitigation targets.

AbstractNuclear energy has provided a major source of clean electricity for South Korea over decades. However, the South Korean Government announced an energy transition roadmap aiming to reduce nuclear shares and increase renewable shares. However, given the nation's high population density, the maximum share of renewable sources for electricity generation in South Korea is constrained. The roadmap was silent on how to fill the gap between a reduced nuclear output and the limited renewable potentials. The tacit alternatives are fossil fuels, and their deployment will become the key determining factor on how South Korea approaches the problem of greenhouse gas emissions reductions. We used scenario analysis to investigate two fossil‐intensive cases, alongside a hypothetical renewable case. On the basis of the comparison of the three scenarios with other countries, we provide an insight into the feasibility and limitations of the nonnuclear options and propose the techno‐economic requirements for avoiding the worst outcomes.

To displace fossil fuels and achieve the global greenhouse-gas emissions reductions required to meet the Paris Agreement on climate change, the prevalent argument is that a mix of different low-carbon energy sources will need to be deployed. Here we seek to challenge that viewpoint. We argue that a completely decarbonized, energy-rich and sustainable future could be achieved with a dominant deployment of next-generation nuclear fission and associated technologies for synthesizing liquid fuels and recycling waste. By contrast, non-dispatchable energy sources like wind and solar energy are arguably superfluous, other than for niche applications, and run the risk of diverting resources away from viable and holistic solutions. For instance, the pairing of variable renewables with natural-gas backup fails to address many of the entrenched problems we seek to solve. Our conclusion is that, given the urgent time frame and massive extent of the energy-replacement challenge, half-measures that distract from or stymie effective policy and infrastructure investment should be avoided.

Abstract For effective climate change mitigation, the global use of fossil fuels for electricity generation, transportation and other industrial uses, will need to be substantially curtailed this century. In a recent Viewpoint in Energy Policy , Trainer (2010) argued that non-carbon energy sources will be insufficient to meet this goal, due to cost, variability, energy storage requirements and other technical limitations. However, his dismissal of nuclear fission energy was cursory and inadequate. Here I argue that fossil fuel replacement this century could, on technical grounds, be achieved via a mix of fission, renewables and fossil fuels with carbon sequestration, with a high degree of electrification, and nuclear supplying over half of final energy. I show that the principal limitations on nuclear fission are not technical, economic or fuel-related, but are instead linked to complex issues of societal acceptance, fiscal and political inertia, and inadequate critical evaluation of the real-world constraints facing low-carbon alternatives.