• Energy Research

Several methods exist to estimate the cumulative carbon emissions that would keep global warming to below a given temperature limit. Here we review estimates reported by the IPCC and the recent literature, and discuss the reasons underlying their differences. The most scientifically robust number-the carbon budget for CO2 -induced warming only-is also the least relevant for real-world policy. Including all greenhouse gases and using methods based on scenarios that avoid instead of exceed a given temperature limit results in lower carbon budgets. For a >66% chance of limiting warming below the internationally agreed temperature limit of 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels, the most appropriate carbon budget estimate is 590-1,240 GtCO2 from 2015 onwards. Variations within this range depend on the probability of staying below 2 °C and on end-of-century non-CO2 warming. Current CO2 emissions are about 40 GtCO2 yr -1, and global CO2 emissions thus have to be reduced urgently to keep within a 2 °C-compatible budget.

Abstract. Detection and attribution (D&A) of forced precipitation change is challenging due to internal variability and limited spatial and temporal coverage of observational records. These factors result in a low signal-to-noise ratio of potential regional and even global trends. Here, we use a statistical method – ridge regression – to create physically interpretable fingerprints for detection of forced changes in mean and extreme precipitation with a high signal-to-noise ratio. The fingerprints are constructed using CMIP6 multi-model output masked to match coverage of three gridded precipitation observational datasets – GHCNDEX, HadEX3, and GPCC –, and are then applied to these observational datasets to assess the degree of forced change detectable in the real-world climate. We show that the signature of forced change is detected in all three observational datasets for global metrics of mean and extreme precipitation. Forced changes are still detectable from changes in the spatial patterns of precipitation even if the global mean trend is removed from the data. This shows detection of forced change in mean and extreme precipitation beyond a global mean trend, and increases confidence in the detection method's power, as well as in climate models' ability to capture the relevant processes that contribute to large-scale patterns of change. We also find, however, that detectability depends on the observational dataset used. Not only coverage differences but also observational uncertainty contribute to dataset disagreement, exemplified by times of emergence of forced change from internal variability ranging from 1998 to 2004 among datasets. Furthermore, different choices for the period over which the forced trend is computed result in different levels of agreement between observations and model projections. These sensitivities may explain apparent contradictions in recent studies on whether models under- or overestimate the observed forced increase in mean and extreme precipitation. Lastly, the detection fingerprints are found to rely primarily on the signal in the extratropical Northern Hemisphere, which is at least partly due to observational coverage, but potentially also due to the presence of a more robust signal in the Northern Hemisphere in general.

Limiting global warming to any level requires limiting the total amount of CO2 emissions, or staying within a CO2 budget. Here we assess how emissions from short-lived non-CO2 species like methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), black-carbon, and sulphates influence these CO2 budgets. Our default case, which assumes mitigation in all sectors and of all gases, results in a CO2 budget between 2011–2100 of 340 PgC for a >66% chance of staying below 2°C, consistent with the assessment of the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Extreme variations of air-pollutant emissions from black-carbon and sulphates influence this budget by about ±5%. In the hypothetical case of no methane or HFCs mitigation—which is unlikely when CO2 is stringently reduced—the budgets would be much smaller (40% or up to 60%, respectively). However, assuming very stringent CH4 mitigation as a sensitivity case, CO2 budgets could be 25% higher. A limit on cumulative CO2 emissions remains critical for temperature targets. Even a 25% higher CO2 budget still means peaking global emissions in the next two decades, and achieving net zero CO2 emissions during the third quarter of the 21st century. The leverage we have to affect the CO2 budget by targeting non-CO2 diminishes strongly along with CO2 mitigation, because these are partly linked through economic and technological factors. Environmental Research Letters, 10 (7) ISSN:1748-9326 ISSN:1748-9318

The oceans play a key role in climate regulation especially in part buffering (neutralising) the effects of increasing levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and rising global temperatures. This chapter examines how the regulatory processes performed by the oceans alter as a response to climate change and assesses the extent to which positive feedbacks from the ocean may exacerbate climate change. There is clear evidence for rapid change in the oceans. As the main heat store for the world there has been an accelerating change in sea temperatures over the last few decades, which has contributed to rising sea-level. The oceans are also the main store of carbon dioxide (CO2), and are estimated to have taken up approximately 40% of anthropogenic-sourced CO2 from the atmosphere since the beginning of the industrial revolution. A proportion of the carbon uptake is exported via the four ocean 'carbon pumps' (Solubility, Biological, Continental Shelf and Carbonate Counter) to the deep ocean reservoir. Increases in sea temperature and changing planktonic systems and ocean currents may lead to a reduction in the uptake of CO2 by the ocean; some evidence suggests a suppression of parts of the marine carbon sink is already underway. While the oceans have buffered climate change through the uptake of CO2 produced by fossil fuel burning this has already had an impact on ocean chemistry through ocean acidification and will continue to do so. Feedbacks to climate change from acidification may result from expected impacts on marine organisms (especially corals and calcareous plankton), ecosystems and biogeochemical cycles. The polar regions of the world are showing the most rapid responses to climate change. As a result of a strong ice-ocean influence, small changes in temperature, salinity and ice cover may trigger large and sudden changes in regional climate with potential downstream feedbacks to the climate of the rest of the world. A warming Arctic Ocean may lead to further releases of the potent greenhouse gas methane from hydrates and permafrost. The Southern Ocean plays a critical role in driving, modifying and regulating global climate change via the carbon cycle and through its impact on adjacent Antarctica. The Antarctic Peninsula has shown some of the most rapid rises in atmospheric and oceanic temperature in the world, with an associated retreat of the majority of glaciers. Parts of the West Antarctic ice sheet are deflating rapidly, very likely due to a change in the flux of oceanic heat to the undersides of the floating ice shelves. The final section on modelling feedbacks from the ocean to climate change identifies limitations and priorities for model development and associated observations. Considering the importance of the oceans to climate change and our limited understanding of climate-related ocean processes, our ability to measure the changes that are taking place are conspicuously inadequate. The chapter highlights the need for a comprehensive, adequately funded and globally extensive ocean observing system to be implemented and sustained as a high priority. Unless feedbacks from the oceans to climate change are adequately included in climate change models, it is possible that the mitigation actions needed to stabilise CO2 and limit temperature rise over the next century will be underestimated.

Global-mean temperature increase is roughly proportional to cumulative emissions of carbon-dioxide (CO2). Limiting global warming to any level thus implies a finite CO2 budget. Due to geophysical uncertainties, the size of such budgets can only be expressed in probabilistic terms and is further influenced by non-CO2 emissions. We here explore how societal choices related to energy demand and specific mitigation options influence the size of carbon budgets for meeting a given temperature objective. We find that choices that exclude specific CO2 mitigation technologies (like Carbon Capture and Storage) result in greater costs, smaller compatible CO2 budgets until 2050, but larger CO2 budgets until 2100. Vice versa, choices that lead to a larger CO2 mitigation potential result in CO2 budgets until 2100 that are smaller but can be met at lower costs. In most cases, these budget variations can be explained by the amount of non-CO2 mitigation that is carried out in conjunction with CO2, and associated global carbon prices that also drive mitigation of non-CO2 gases. Budget variations are of the order of 10% around their central value. In all cases, limiting warming to below 2 °C thus still implies that CO2 emissions need to be reduced rapidly in the coming decades. Environmental Research Letters, 10 (7) ISSN:1748-9326 ISSN:1748-9318