• Energy Research

Metals are distributed in the earth's crust in varying amounts and ore concentrations, implying that some countries have more metal resources than others. This inequality in geological resource distribution may lead to potential constraints and bottlenecks of a steady resource supply. In the context of strategic planning and innovation, and in scientific literature, this aspect is often referred to as geopolitical supply risk. In the past few decades, cobalt crisis, the oil embargo, and the more recent Rare Earth Elements (REEs) issue are the best examples regarding the geopolitical supply risk of mineral resources. The aim of this study is to present a historical overview of the development in geopolitical supply risk of 52 metals during the past two decades and to support an assessment of such risk in the future, i.e. 2050. A geographical mapping of metals primary production in 1994 and 2013 is included which shows a shift from developed economies to developing economies over this time period. Our analysis demonstrates that the geopolitical supply risk of metals has been fluctuating during the past two decades due to change in the number and production share of producing countries. During this time period, Chinese share of global metals production has increased from 23% to 44%. China, today, is also the dominant supplier of 34 metals, out of which 23 are considered as critical resources by the European Commission. The future geopolitical supply risk is less dependent on the present production distribution and more dependent on the location of current geological resources and the future discoveries, as well as on the technological development to improve profitability of mining the currently sub-economical resources.

Metals are distributed in the earth's crust in varying amounts and ore concentrations, implying that some countries have more metal resources than others. This inequality in geological resource distribution may lead to potential constraints and bottlenecks of a steady resource supply. In the context of strategic planning and innovation, and in scientific literature, this aspect is often referred to as geopolitical supply risk. In the past few decades, cobalt crisis, the oil embargo, and the more recent Rare Earth Elements (REEs) issue are the best examples regarding the geopolitical supply risk of mineral resources. The aim of this study is to present a historical overview of the development in geopolitical supply risk of 52 metals during the past two decades and to support an assessment of such risk in the future, i.e. 2050. A geographical mapping of metals primary production in 1994 and 2013 is included which shows a shift from developed economies to developing economies over this time period. Our analysis demonstrates that the geopolitical supply risk of metals has been fluctuating during the past two decades due to change in the number and production share of producing countries. During this time period, Chinese share of global metals production has increased from 23% to 44%. China, today, is also the dominant supplier of 34 metals, out of which 23 are considered as critical resources by the European Commission. The future geopolitical supply risk is less dependent on the present production distribution and more dependent on the location of current geological resources and the future discoveries, as well as on the technological development to improve profitability of mining the currently sub-economical resources.

Abstract Bioeconomy is seen as a key strategic innovation pillar in the European Union, and this involves, among other things, mobilizing biomass resources. This study presents a geo-localized methodology in order to quantify the overall (theoretical) residual biomass potential for each NUTS-3 region of the EU-27 + Switzerland (NUTS-3 is the smallest regional division in Eurostat's Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics). Estimates were made for biomass residues stemming from 4 main activities: i) agriculture (straw, manure, residues from pruning permanent plantations); ii) forestry (forestry residues); iii) urban greenery management (residues from managing urban green areas and roadside vegetation); and iv) food waste (agri-industrial food process waste and municipal biodegradable waste). A review of earlier assessments using a variety of spatial coverages is also presented. Our results reveal the importance of residual biomass as a key feedstock for the European bioeconomy: we found that 8500 PJ y−1 are available for these streams (theoretical potential), which corresponds to the whole annual (2015) primary energy consumption of Italy and Belgium combined. Straw (3800 PJ y−1) and forestry residues (3200 PJ y−1) were shown as the top-two contributors. Our geo-localized approach uncovered outliers in terms of regional trends, revealing very specific opportunities for these regions. This includes the NUTS-3 region of Paris (France) where the highest biomass density was found with ca. 25 TJ km−2 (essentially food waste), and the NUTS-3 of Jaen (Spain), the main region of olive oil in the world, with great opportunities stemming from the olive oil industry.

Abstract Bioeconomy is seen as a key strategic innovation pillar in the European Union, and this involves, among other things, mobilizing biomass resources. This study presents a geo-localized methodology in order to quantify the overall (theoretical) residual biomass potential for each NUTS-3 region of the EU-27 + Switzerland (NUTS-3 is the smallest regional division in Eurostat's Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics). Estimates were made for biomass residues stemming from 4 main activities: i) agriculture (straw, manure, residues from pruning permanent plantations); ii) forestry (forestry residues); iii) urban greenery management (residues from managing urban green areas and roadside vegetation); and iv) food waste (agri-industrial food process waste and municipal biodegradable waste). A review of earlier assessments using a variety of spatial coverages is also presented. Our results reveal the importance of residual biomass as a key feedstock for the European bioeconomy: we found that 8500 PJ y−1 are available for these streams (theoretical potential), which corresponds to the whole annual (2015) primary energy consumption of Italy and Belgium combined. Straw (3800 PJ y−1) and forestry residues (3200 PJ y−1) were shown as the top-two contributors. Our geo-localized approach uncovered outliers in terms of regional trends, revealing very specific opportunities for these regions. This includes the NUTS-3 region of Paris (France) where the highest biomass density was found with ca. 25 TJ km−2 (essentially food waste), and the NUTS-3 of Jaen (Spain), the main region of olive oil in the world, with great opportunities stemming from the olive oil industry.

Abstract Most climate change mitigation scenarios restricting global warming to 1.5 °C rely heavily on negative emissions technologies and practices (NETPs). Here we updated previous literature reviews and conducted an analysis to identify the most appealing NETPs. We evaluated 36 NETPs configurations considering their technical maturity, economic feasibility, greenhouse gas removal potential, resource use, and environmental impacts. We found multiple trade-offs among these indicators, which suggests that a regionalised portfolio of NETPs exploiting their complementary strengths is the way forward. Although no single NETP is superior to the others in terms of all the indicators simultaneously, we identified 16 Pareto-efficient NETPs. Among them, six are deemed particularly promising: forestation, soil carbon sequestration (SCS), enhanced weathering with olivine and three modalities of direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS). While the co-benefits, lower costs and higher maturity levels of forestation and SCS can propel their rapid deployment, these NETPs require continuous monitoring to reduce unintended side-effects—most notably the release of the stored carbon. Enhanced weathering also shows an overall good performance and substantial co-benefits, but its risks—especially those concerning human health—should be further investigated prior to deployment. DACCS presents significantly fewer side-effects, mainly its substantial energy demand; early investments in this NETP could reduce costs and accelerate its scale-up. Our insights can help guide future research and plan for the sustainable scale-up of NETPs, which we must set into motion within this decade.

Abstract Most climate change mitigation scenarios restricting global warming to 1.5 °C rely heavily on negative emissions technologies and practices (NETPs). Here we updated previous literature reviews and conducted an analysis to identify the most appealing NETPs. We evaluated 36 NETPs configurations considering their technical maturity, economic feasibility, greenhouse gas removal potential, resource use, and environmental impacts. We found multiple trade-offs among these indicators, which suggests that a regionalised portfolio of NETPs exploiting their complementary strengths is the way forward. Although no single NETP is superior to the others in terms of all the indicators simultaneously, we identified 16 Pareto-efficient NETPs. Among them, six are deemed particularly promising: forestation, soil carbon sequestration (SCS), enhanced weathering with olivine and three modalities of direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS). While the co-benefits, lower costs and higher maturity levels of forestation and SCS can propel their rapid deployment, these NETPs require continuous monitoring to reduce unintended side-effects—most notably the release of the stored carbon. Enhanced weathering also shows an overall good performance and substantial co-benefits, but its risks—especially those concerning human health—should be further investigated prior to deployment. DACCS presents significantly fewer side-effects, mainly its substantial energy demand; early investments in this NETP could reduce costs and accelerate its scale-up. Our insights can help guide future research and plan for the sustainable scale-up of NETPs, which we must set into motion within this decade.