• Energy Research

Climate change due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of precipitation events, which is likely to affect the probability of flooding into the future. In this paper we use river flow simulations from nine global hydrology and land surface models to explore uncertainties in the potential impacts of climate change on flood hazard at global scale. As an indicator of flood hazard we looked at changes in the 30-y return level of 5-d average peak flows under representative concentration pathway RCP8.5 at the end of this century. Not everywhere does climate change result in an increase in flood hazard: decreases in the magnitude and frequency of the 30-y return level of river flow occur at roughly one-third (20–45%) of the global land grid points, particularly in areas where the hydrograph is dominated by the snowmelt flood peak in spring. In most model experiments, however, an increase in flooding frequency was found in more than half of the grid points. The current 30-y flood peak is projected to occur in more than 1 in 5 y across 5–30% of land grid points. The large-scale patterns of change are remarkably consistent among impact models and even the driving climate models, but at local scale and in individual river basins there can be disagreement even on the sign of change, indicating large modeling uncertainty which needs to be taken into account in local adaptation studies.

Abstract This paper presents an evaluation of the global and regional consequences of climate change for heat extremes, water resources, river and coastal flooding, droughts, agriculture and energy use. It presents change in hazard and resource base under different rates of climate change (representative concentration pathways (RCP)), and socio-economic impacts are estimated for each combination of RCP and shared socioeconomic pathway. Uncertainty in the regional pattern of climate change is characterised by CMIP5 climate model projections. The analysis adopts a novel approach using relationships between level of warming and impact to rapidly estimate impacts under any climate forcing. The projections provided here can be used to inform assessments of the implications of climate change. At the global scale all the consequences of climate change considered here are adverse, with large increases under the highest rates of warming. Under the highest forcing the global average annual chance of a major heatwave increases from 5% now to 97% in 2100, the average proportion of time in drought increases from 7% to 27%, and the average chance of the current 50 year flood increases from 2% to 7%. The socio-economic impacts of these climate changes are determined by socio-economic scenario. There is variability in impact across regions, reflecting variability in projected changes in precipitation and temperature. The range in the estimated impacts can be large, due to uncertainty in future emissions and future socio-economic conditions and scientific uncertainty in how climate changes in response to future emissions. For the temperature-based indicators, the largest source of scientific uncertainty is in the estimated magnitude of equilibrium climate sensitivity, but for the indicators determined by precipitation the largest source is in the estimated spatial and seasonal pattern of changes in precipitation. By 2100, the range across socio-economic scenario is often greater than the range across the forcing levels.

Scenarios are used to explore the consequences of different adaptation and mitigation strategies under uncertainty. In this paper, two scenarios are used to explore developments with (1) no mitigation leading to an increase of global mean temperature of 4 °C by 2100 and (2) an ambitious mitigation strategy leading to 2 °C increase by 2100. For the second scenario, uncertainties in the climate system imply that a global mean temperature increase of 3 °C or more cannot be ruled out. Our analysis shows that, in many cases, adaptation and mitigation are not trade-offs but supplements. For example, the number of people exposed to increased water resource stress due to climate change can be substantially reduced in the mitigation scenario, but adaptation will still be required for the remaining large numbers of people exposed to increased stress. Another example is sea level rise, for which, from a global and purely monetary perspective, adaptation (up to 2100) seems more effective than mitigation. From the perspective of poorer and small island countries, however, stringent mitigation is necessary to keep risks at manageable levels. For agriculture, only a scenario based on a combination of adaptation and mitigation is able to avoid serious climate change impacts.

This paper investigates whether and to what extent a wide range of actors in the UK are adapting to climate change, and whether this is evidence of a social transition. We document evidence of over 300 examples of early adopters of adaptation practice to climate change in the UK. These examples span a range of activities from small adjustments (or coping), to building adaptive capacity, to implementing actions and to creating deeper systemic change in public and private organisations in a range of sectors. We find that adaptation in the UK has been dominated by government initiatives and has principally occurred in the form of research into climate change impacts. These government initiatives have stimulated a further set of actions at other scales in public agencies, regulatory agencies and regional government (and the devolved administrations), though with little real evidence of climate change adaptation initiatives trickling down to local government level. The sectors requiring significant investment in large scale infrastructure have invested more heavily than those that do not in identifying potential impacts and adaptations. Thus we find a higher level of adaptation activity by the water supply and flood defence sectors. Sectors that are not dependent on large scale infrastructure appear to be investing far less effort and resources in preparing for climate change. We conclude that the UK government-driven top-down targeted adaptation approach has generated anticipatory action at low cost in some areas. We also conclude that these actions may have created enough niche activities to allow for diffusion of new adaptation practices in response to real or perceived climate change. These results have significant implications for how climate policy can be developed to support autonomous adaptors in the UK and other countries.

For the Chinese, French, German, and Spanish translations of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section.